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1. Housing policy in Indonesia 
Housing is one of the basic needs of human beings, on a level with food, education and 
health. The need for housing is therefore one of those that have to be fulfilled by the 
state. The United Nations has also included the right to housing in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Article 11, which states:  
The countries taking this Covenant acknowledge the right of everybody to an 
adequate standard of living, including the right to food, clothing, and 
housing… The countries will take measures to guarantee the realization of 
these rights… 
The Covenant is binding to Indonesia as it was ratified in 2005. Apart from that, in the 
Indonesian Constitution, the right to housing is one of the basic rights guaranteed by the 
state. Article 28H (1) of the Constitution 1945 as amended stipulates: 
All people are entitled to a healthy life, physically and mentally, and housing, 
as well as a good and healthy environment, and are entitled to access to 
health services. 
Meanwhile Law number 4 Year 1992 on Housing and Settlement, particularly Article 5 
point (1), provides: 
All citizens are entitled to reside in or enjoy and/or own a proper house in a 
healthy, secure, orderly environment. 
The state of Indonesia is therefore responsible for providing decent and healthy (in other 
words, conducive to inhabitants’ well-being) housing for all citizens. This is however not 
an easy task as Indonesia is a country with the fourth biggest population in the world. In 
2000, the population of Indonesia was 209 million. Although Indonesia is managing to 
reduce its overall population growth, the population growth in urban areas is still high, 
scoring around 5 per cent per year. In 2000, 40 per cent of the population lived in urban 
areas. This percentage is expected to continue to increase every year. United Nations 
Center for Human Settlements predicts that, in 2025, the urban population will reach 61 
per cent1. 
Urbanization and the growing concentration of population in big cities, particularly in 
Java, will create a number of problems, placing pressure on transportation, sanitation 
and general provision of healthy environment. As the main island, Java is home to 120 
million of people or 60 per cent of the country population. 20 per cent lives in Sumatera 
Island and the remainder lives in the other islands 2. 
The decreasing rural population is a consequence of the declining role of the agricultural 
sector in Indonesia’s economy. The development strategy that has been put in place 
systematically starting in the 1960s brings industry as the main engine of economic 
growth. Although the agricultural sector was considered an important one in the Main 
Guidelines of State Operation (Garis Besar Haluan Negara, GBHN) that was the 
development strategic plan of the New Orde Government, in fact the industrial and 
service sectors were the backbone of growth. The minimal investment and innovation 
                                                   
1
 ADB, 2001  
2
 ADB, 2001 
  2
made the agricultural sector unable to grow more than 3 per cent, while the service and 
industrial sectors could grow more than 10 per cent 3. 
The problem arising from this situation is that the industrial and service sectors develop 
in the urban areas with complete infrastructure. This leads to flow of urbanization to big 
cities. The agricultural sector in rural areas cannot support many livelihoods and people 
are forced to find work in industrial and service sectors in the urban areas. The problem 
grows even bigger with the increasing gap between big cities in Java, particularly 
Jakarta, and other cities in the other islands. With its supporting infrastructure, Java 
becomes the main target of urbanization. 
In the coming years, the urban areas will be under the pressure to provide housing for 
their residents. Although decentralization policy was issued and the local governments 
are granted autonomy to manage their own administration, in reality development is still 
concentrated in big cities and Java Island. Even the infrastructure development project 
launched by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration still put an emphasis on projects 
in Jakarta and Java Island. The absence of incentives in, for instance, some tollroad 
development project bids leads to competition among contractors only in projects around 
Jakarta. Other tollroad projects, especially outside Java Island, do not attract interest. 
Given the wide gap between the infrastructure in the urban and rural areas as well as 
between Java Island and the others, the flow of urbanization never changes. The figure 
keeps going up even though the rate is not as high as previous years. As a result, the 
housing issue is one of the strategic and urgent problems to settle.  
1.1 The need for housing in Indonesia 
How big is the need for housing in Indonesia? The Ministry for Settlement and Regional 
Infrastructure predicts that the need for housing in Indonesia will soon reach 800,000 
units per year. This prediction is in addition to the backlog or gap in provision of housing 
that has not been met before: 5.93 million houses in 2003. If the government provides 
1,150,000 houses per year, the need for housing for the whole population of Indonesia 
will be fulfilled in 17 years4. 
Professor Johan Silas, of Institute of Technology (ITS) based in Surabaya, asserted in a 
seminar on people’s housing in Jakarta on January 6, 2006, the need to comprehend the 
issue of backlog critically. The data on the backlog actually came from a survey 
conducted by BPS (Central Statistic Bureau). However, the parameters used to 
determine whether a house is healthy or not need to be examined; for instance, whether 
the wall can be made from wood or a house can serve multiple purposes. Culturally, 
there are many ethnic groups in Indonesia with a tradition of having houses made from 
wood or bamboo and they are healthy houses. Similarly, many houses also serve as 
business places so that they become classified as ‘unhealthy’. It has been a tradition that 
a house is not only where people live but also used for other purposes.  
Professor Silas described the Javanese family’s house. In the night this is a place to 
sleep, in the morning a place to cook, in the afternoon a place for other household 
activities and back to a place to sleep in the night. According to BPS survey, this kind of 
house falls into the category of unhealthy house or below living standards. Consequently, 
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according to Prof. Silas, the approach to deal with the backlog problem cannot be a one-
size-fit-all national policy, but a policy that can be adjusted with unique cultures in 
different regions. 
Generally, from the existing housing, there are 14.5 million or 28.22 per cent houses that 
are below living standards. In addition, the slum area in Indonesia is as many as 10,065 
areas inhabited by around 17.2 million people, scattered in 10,000 locations, with an area 
as large as 47.4 million hectare5. Meanwhile, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) makes 
an estimation of housing need in detail as illustrated in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Estimation of housing need (in thousands) 
Year 1990 2000 2000 – 
2010 
2011 – 
2020 
Total population 179.379 212.739 277.684 362.457 
Urban population, in percentage of total  40.3% 50% 60% 
Urban population  55.428 85.734 138.842 217.474 
Size of household  4.3 4.2 4.1 
Rate of population growth  2.7% 2.7%  
Total households 12.890 19.938 33.058 53.042 
Increase in number of households   13.120 19.985 
Ratio household/house  0.9 0.9 0.9 
Housing needed   11.808 17.986 
Annual rate of mobility  0.01 0.01 0.01 
Increase of annual rate of mobility   2.650 4.305 
Total new houses   15.769 24.290 
Gap/backlog 7.7%    
Figure to close the gap  1.382   
Average need for housing/year   1.646 2.498 
Most needy group 8%  132 200 
Needy group 27%  444 674 
Very low income 23%  379 575 
Low income 35%  576 874 
Middle and upper income 7%  115 175 
Total 100%  1.646 2.498 
Source: ADB, 2001. 
 
As can be seen in Table 1, ADB estimates that over the 10-year period between 2000 
and 2010 the urban population will become 50 per cent of the total population of 
Indonesia. By the end of 2020, the percentage of urban residents will become 60 per 
cent or 217.47 million. The population growth in urban areas will in turn increase the 
demand for housing. 
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In 2000, there were almost 20 million households and this will increase by the end of the 
decade to 33 million and to 53 in the next decade. The increased number of households 
will boost the demand for housing. With the assumption that the ratio of household/house 
is 0.9 at the end of 2010 it is estimated that 15.77 million houses will be needed and 
24.29 million more at the end of 2020. Calculated annually, between 2000 and 2010 
there will be a demand for 1.646 million houses per year, and this increases in the 
decade of 2011-2020 to 2.498 million houses annually.   
Looking at the projection, despite the government’s success in launching the project of 
one million houses per year, the real demand is not yet fulfilled when the population who 
do not own a house are taken into account. ADB notes that 1.38 million houses were 
needed in 2000 to cover backlog. The figure has gone up and Ministry of Settlement and 
Public Infrastructure calculated in 2003 that the backlog reached a figure of 5.93 million 
houses.  
When the need for housing is put into detail of demand for each segment of society, the 
demand of upper and middle class is only 7 per cent. This means that the market share 
of upper-middle class housing that does not require subsidy and government’s 
intervention is only 115 million/year in the period of 2000-2010 and 175 million/year in the 
following decade. Meanwhile, the remaining 93 is the lower-middle income group who 
needs government’s assistance.  
It is to be noted that the estimates released by ADB do not included the category of 
unhealthy houses and slum settlement, while these constitute an urgent issue to 
overcome, both by the national and local governments.  
Given the facts, the government – with an obligation to provide decent housing for the 
people – faces a serious problem. This is even so if we consider the impact of economic 
crises and the large amount of fuel subsidy the government has to finance. Along with 
the pressure of the debt repayments, domestic or foreign, all these make the Indonesian 
government unable to secure funding for provision of housing.  
As a strategy to overcome the gap between actual and ideal conditions, the government 
launched the National Movement of One Million House Construction in 2003. However, 
the government has failed to complete it. 600,000 houses were constructed 
independently by the community and 200,000 underwent quality enhancement. The 
government only provided technical assistance such as provision of drawings of a 
‘healthy, simple house’ [homes that use simple construction technologies and are 
conducive to the health of those living in them] that can be used by the community6. This 
contribution is very small and insignificant as the government is unable to reduce other 
costs paid by the community, such as land and licensing cost. 
 
1.2 Secondary mortgage facility 
In the One-Million-House Movement, the government’s direct contribution was 
channelled through Perumnas, a government housing company, and in the form of a 
subsidy through House Ownership Credit (Kredit Pemilikan Rumah, KPR) for 200,000 
houses. While the interest rate of KPR is 15 per cent, through the subsidy the recipients 
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will only have to pay 5 to 6 per cent interest rate per year. However, this subsidy is 
provided in phases over five years. After five years, the buyers have to pay the normal 
interest rate7. 
In future, the government’s contribution in housing provision will be channelled through 
Sarana Multigriya Finansial Ltd, a Secondary Mortgage Facility established by the 
government of Indonesia in mid 2005. Being a new state-owned enterprise, Sarana 
Multigriya Finansial Ltd will get an initial capital of IDR 2.5 trillion. 1 trillion of the capital 
comes from the National Budget while the remainder comes from Jamsostek, the state-
owned enterprise managing pension funds for private sector workers and state-owned 
enterprise employees. In addition, Sarana Ltd will receive technical assistance from 
international financial institutions, e.g. ADB and International Finance Corporation, an 
institution under the World Bank8. 
The Secondary Mortgage Facility (SMF) is an institution that is expected to be able to 
support housing finance. Most of funds collected by the banks from society are short-
term savings, while housing finance credit is long-term credit. If the savings are suddenly 
withdrawn by the society, banks will face difficulty. This adds to the problem caused by 
the low confidence that society has in the banks. The 1997 crisis, which was followed by 
closure of a number of banks and massive withdrawals of savings, forced the 
government to intervene. The guarantee by Indonesian Central Bank, Bank Indonesia, 
until 2005 and the establishment of Saving Guarantor Institution (Lembaga Penjamin 
Simpanan) for all funds deposited by the society in Indonesian banks are indicators of 
how prone the banks are to monetary instability. 
The Indonesian banking situation means that few banks have the courage to provide 
long-term housing credit. Only banks with big capital reserves dare to enter the housing 
finance business. The percentage is also still small in comparison to BTN – Bank 
Tabungan Negara – which focuses on housing finance. Credit channelled by BTN to the 
housing sector is more than 90 per cent of the total housing credit. Most big private 
banks, even when they enter the housing business, provide very small funds due to their 
limited experience and knowledge as well as low commitment. Moreover, apart from the 
long term of the credit, i.e. 10-15 years, the profit gained from housing credit is not as 
large as corporate credit. In order to encourage banks to provide funds to the housing 
sector, a guarantor institution in the form of SMF is much needed. SMF will buy long-term 
housing credit so that banks do not have to worry about provid housing credit for society 
over a reasonable period. 
Apart from providing a guarantee against mismatch of short-term savings and long-term 
credit, SMF also guarantees several other risks in housing funding9. First of these is the 
risk of interest rate. Housing credit is usually offered at a relatively stable interest, while 
funds provided by third party are offered by banks with floating interest rate. If the interest 
rate suddenly rises, as when it went up to 18 per cent at the end of 2005 following the 
rise of fuel prices, the ability of people to access housing credit will decrease. 
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Secondly, SMF guarantees the credit risk. The investor putting funds in will avoid credit 
risk as the loan provided to a KPR lender is guaranteed by a bank credit. A guarantee 
against credit risk is much needed in Indonesia, primarily because of the experience of 
the economic crisis in 1998. Many credits that were not guaranteed dragged banks to 
bankruptcy and eventually recapitalized10. 
The presence of SMF also provides an alternative for investment for non-bank financial 
institutions such as insurance companies and pension-fund managers. Ultimately, SMF 
will decrease the interest rate of housing credit and increase opportunity of the society to 
own a house. In addition, similar institutions have been established and gained success 
in several neighbouring countries, such as Malaysia and Thailand.   
However, SMF cannot afford to fund all demands for housing in Indonesia. From the plan 
to construction of one million houses, only 200,000 units can be supported by SMF. The 
remaining 600,000 units will be constructed independently and 200,000 in the form of 
quality enhancement of housing. This illustrates how important are the roles of private 
sector and community self-reliance in provision of houses.   
The big role of community self-reliance in provision of houses is estimated to reach 80 
per cent of total houses in Indonesia11. The role of the society is also reflected in the 
condition of most big cities in the country. The settlement in Indonesia, known as 
kampong or informal housing, is usually not developed with planning. Only 10 to 20 per 
cent of housing areas, known as formal housing, are developed systematically and with 
good planning. 
Informal housing is an accumulation of houses constructed by families or individuals 
without following a rule or formal plan issued by an authority. The services and facilities 
like roads, drainage, sanitation and drinking water supply are not designed and prepared 
before. All are sought by families or individuals. Table 2 compares formal and informal 
housing areas in Indonesia. 
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Table 2. Settlement in Indonesia 
Initiative of housing development Development initiator 
Organized Government and companies (Perumnas, developers and 
other housing development organizations) and following 
rules stipulated by the regional/city government.  
Formal 
Individual Individual/family following rules and infrastructure network 
determined by the regional/city government. 
Legal Individual/family/group developing on their land without 
following construction rules and generally not equipped 
with infrastructure network. 
Informal 
Illegal Individual/family/group constructing not on their land and 
not following construction rules. 
Source: Modified from Kuswartojo, 2005: 108. 
 
A kampong or informal settlement develops on the community’s initiative and grows 
naturally so that the shape and arrangement of the city vary. Unfortunately, because of 
the pressure of urbanization in big cities and the rising land price, the number of houses 
and the size of the kampong do not grow but the number of inhabitants rockets. As a 
result, the kampong changes into slum areas. 
Indonesia’s government itself has not provided housing for its people in either of the two 
ways: developing directly or controlling the housing development. We can compare this 
with the situation in Europe where 40 to 60 per cent of the housing is developed by the 
government. Meanwhile in China, before 1980, all housing was developed by the 
government 12.  
Even when the Indonesian government is said to provide housing, it is mostly in the form 
of houses for civil servants, such as those managed by Housing Saving Advisory Board 
(Badan Pertimbangan Tabungan Perumahan, Bapertarum). Up to 2005, Bapertarum had 
provided housing for 30,000 civil servants. For the Indonesian National Military Forces 
(Tentara Nasional Indonesia) and employees in the offices under Ministry of Defence, 
housing is provided by the Foundation of Housing Welfare for Soldiers and Civil Servants 
of Ministry of Defence (YKPP).  
On a limited scale, the Indonesian government has also provided housing for the public 
through Perum Perumnas, which is basically a real estate company owned by the 
government. However, due to various problems such as corruption, from 1974 to 2004 
Perumnas could only develop 453,000 houses. Added to this was the tight set of 
requirements from banks to get a housing mortgage. As a result, the people have to 
provide their own housing. Then informal housing or kampong has grown naturally in big 
cities, and Jakarta as the capital has the biggest kampong in Indonesia.  
 
1.3 Ministry of People’s Housing  
The economic crisis taking place in 1997 not only increased the number of the poor but 
also decreased people’s purchasing power, including the affordability for houses. 
Investment in the housing sector was much left behind compared to the developed 
countries. In Indonesia, the ratio of housing credit to GDP (Gross Domestic Product) was 
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only 1.4 per cent in 2002, and once reached its peak at 3.2 per cent in 1997. As a 
comparison, Malaysia’s ratio is 27.7 per cent while the USA’s was 45.3 per cent in 
200213. 
In order to provide housing, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono re-established the 
Ministry of People’s Housing. The Ministry was changed during the Abdurrahman Wahid 
administration into a directorate, i.e. Directorate of Housing and Settlement under the 
Ministry of Settlement, Infrastructure and Regional Affairs. The effectiveness of this 
ministry is questioned as it only has the status of a state ministry, not a department. This 
way, the ministry is capable of coordination, not policy implementation. Some policy 
implementation functions are still held by Ministry of Public Works.  
In 2004, the State Ministry of People’s Housing set a target to provide as many as 
1,350,000 healthy simple houses, which would be developed in the five years from 2004 
to 2009. Apart from that, the government would also provide rented simple flats (Rumah 
Susun Sederhana Sewa, Rusunawa), owned simple flats (Rumah Susun Sederhana 
Milik, Rusunami), self-initiated, also known as formal, housing (Perumahan Swadaya) 
and a facility for self-initiated housing (Fasilitas Perumahan Swadaya) and in the form of 
a Ready-for-Construction Area (Kawasan Siap Bangun, Kasiba) or Ready-for-
Construction Land (Lahan Siap Bangun, Lasiba). Rusunawa is provided for people with 
fixed and not fixed income of IDR 350,000 - 1,500,000, while Rusunami for those who 
have fixed income of more than IDR 1.5 million and can access subsidized House 
Ownership Credit (KPR). 
By the end of December 2005, the target was unattainable. Development of basic 
housing could only be done for 68,913 as opposed to the plan of 120,000. This even 
included 14,133 simple homes that had not been subsidized. Similar was the 
development plan of Rusunawa and Rusunami: the target could not be realized. Table 3 
describes the mid-term plan, target and numbers achieved by 2005 as well as 2006 
target of the State Ministry of People’s Housing. 
Table 3. Plan and target of State Ministry of People’s Housing 
Activity Target of 
RPJM14 
2004-2009 
Target of 
2005 
Realization 
Dec 20, 2005 
Target of 
2006 
Rumah Sederhana Sehat 
(Healthy Simple House) 
1,350,000 120,000 Subsidized 
54,780 
Not-subsidized 
14,133 
130,000 
Rusunawa 60,000 6,000 4,312 12,000 
Rusunami 25,000 2,000 n.a. 5,000 
Self-initiated Housing 
Facility of Self-initiated 
Housing 
3,600,000 
720,000 
720,000 
20,000 
n.a. 
19,958 
720,000 
23,000 
Kasiba/Lasiba 79 2 1 14 
Source: Inforum, December 2005 
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The other complicated issue faced by the Minister of People’s Housing is the support for 
Self-initiated housing and facility of Self-initiated housing. Self-initiated housing or 
informal housing is produced with minimum engagement of the government. The Ministry 
of People’s Housing has not found the right formula to support self-initiated housing. 
Those that are developed fully on the initiative of the community mostly depend on the 
market. To construct or renovate a house, the people buy construction materials in the 
market. Only a small part of the capital needed is obtained by bank loan, particularly 
because the community cannot meet the formal requirements to get credit. 
The autonomous position of the local government enables the authority to create housing 
policy at the local level. Therefore, the policy of the Ministry of People’s Housing is not 
necessarily followed by Heads of Region. As a result, the provision of various incentives 
for licensing simplification that has been proposed by the Ministry will be decided 
according to the political will of the local governments. 
 
1.4 Impact of crisis 
In 1997 Indonesia was dragged into the whirl of economic crisis. Indonesian economic 
growth dropped to minus 13.3 per cent and inflation rocketed to 77.9 per cent. The crisis 
resulted in the decreasing government capacity to provide subsidy for housing, especially 
as the crisis was accompanied by currency depreciation, from IDR 2,500/USD to 
IDR 17,000/USD before it stabilizes around the rate of IDR 10,000/USD. Rupiah 
depreciation raised the amount of foreign debt that the government had to pay and now 
almost half the state budget is spent on paying off the foreign debt.  
For housing, the government allocates a budget through the Ministry of People’s Housing 
and Ministry of Public Works. In the State Budget of 2005, the State Ministry of People’s 
Housing received an allocation of IDR 314.45 billion. IDR 212.11 billion was used for 
housing development programme and IDR 101.34 billion was the fund for a housing 
community empowerment programme15. The fund for housing was also allocated by the 
national government through placement of capital in Sarana Multigriya Finance Ltd. 
This amount is very small to be able to provide housing for the people. We can compare 
this with the large amount of debt repayment instalment that has to be paid and reaches 
IDR 63.6 trillion in State Budget of 2005. Meanwhile, at the same time people have to 
pay different kinds of taxes, which contribute to 80 per cent of the total revenue of the 
State Budget. 
The other impact of crisis was the bankruptcy of a number of real estate companies. 
Before the crisis, there were 2,500 members of Real Estate Indonesia – the association 
of Indonesian real estate companies. Of these, 60 per cent or 1,500 went bankrupt. 
Meanwhile, among the 1,000 who escaped bankruptcy, 870 had to go under the 
oversight of BPPN (IBRA). Consequently, only 130 companies still exist and are actively 
developing housing; they are mostly small and medium-scale developers in the regions16. 
After the crisis was gradually over and the economy was recovering, the property sector 
also awakened. Moreover, when BPPN managed to restructure bad credit in property 
sector, this sector started to recover. However, it was ironic that what were mostly 
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 Bisnis Indonesia Daily, 19/07/05 
16
 PSPI&PSA, 2005: 2-2 
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developed were office buildings, shopping centres, apartments and middle to upper class 
housing. 
 
Table 4. Capitalization of comercial projects during 2000 – 2005P17 (IDR billion) 
Project Title 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
amended 
Jabotabek modern 
shopping centre 
project 
2,756.09 4,484.30 9,828.00 15,937.90 21,368.02 19,363.63 
Regional modern 
shopping centre 
project 
181.20 577.90 4,152.30 13,440.37 16,538.99 13,367.96 
Jabotabek apartment 
project 
797.95 915.89 1,484.00 4,064.58 7,909.72 11,859.84 
Regional apartment 
project 
- 158.40 249.40 361.82 236.24 311.19 
Jabotabek office 
project 
726.70 604.20 106.14 577.43 870.90 1,066.25 
Hotel project (national) - - 59,16 885.32 1,319.64 1,327.70 
Housing project 
(national) 
3,495.00 4,037.00 7,129.00 8,708.00 11,571.00 15,078.00 
Home store / home 
project (national) 
1,922.00 2,220.00 3,938.00 5,582.50 6,364.05 7,812.15 
Capitalization of 
national property 
project  
9,879 12,998 26,946 49,558 66,179 70,187 
Source: Modified from PSPI&PSA, 2005: 2-30. 
 
After the property sector started to recover, what grew fastest was the development of 
modern shopping centres, both in Jabotabek and in the regions. After that came 
apartment construction in Jabotabek, and only later capitalization of housing provision 
projects. So the awakening of the property sector is practically an attempt to reap profit 
by developing shopping centres.  
The data above also show that the one significant contributor in the awakening of the 
property sector is the private sector, particularly top level developers. Therefore, the data 
also illustrate how the resurgence of property sector is purely boosted by business 
interests, to maximize profit with minimum intervention and incentive from the 
government. As entrepreneurs, developers must prefer developing shopping centres and 
luxurious housing. A few of these will bring larger profit than can be gained by developing 
middle level and simple housing. Here the government needs to intervene and offer 
incentives so that the property sector has an interest in providing housing for the poor. 
 
                                                   
17
 Data tahun 2005  masih berupa perkiraan, bukan situasi yang nyata. 
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1.5 Housing for the poor 
In the past, government policy was much more on the side of the poor. Through the 1-3-6 
policy, a real estate company that developed one luxurious house was obliged to develop 
three middle houses and six simple houses. However, this policy was actually never 
enforced, and then the Ministry of People’s Housing was dismissed and established as a 
division in the Ministry of Settlement and Regional Infrastructure.  
The government’s initiative to provide housing for the poor also included the 
establishment of Bank Tabungan Negara (BTN), the State Saving Bank. This bank is the 
only one focusing on the provision of housing for the lower middle class. The large role of 
BTN can be seen from the credit the Bank has channelled. In 1997, from the total of 
housing credit, 85 per cent was provided by BTN18. Indeed, apart from BTN whose 
shares are owned by the government, there was Papan Sejahtera Bank (BPS) which 
also focused on housing finance. However, unlike BTN, BPS provided credit for housing 
finance for the upper middle class. When the economic crisis hit Indonesia, BPS was one 
of the liquidated banks.  
Another role played by the government was the establishment of the company of 
National Housing Development (Perusahaan Pembangunan Perumahan Nasional, 
Perumnas). Perumnas is a government-owned company working in housing construction, 
particularly simple housing. One of the achievements of Perumnas to note as the pioneer 
of development companies is its success in introducing housing complexes in big cities.  
Among other examples is the development of housing in Depok in southern Jakarta. 
Initially, Depok was just a subdistrict under the administration of Bogor District. In 1974, 
Perumnas developed 4,876 units on an area of land of just over 90 hectares in Depok I. 
After this were North Depok with 1,311 unit on an area of 33 hectares, Central Depok II 
with 5,663 units on 110 hectares, East Depok II with 8,620 units on 168 hectares, and on 
the remaining land 382 units were developed. 
Slowly Depok started to develop. The presence of Perumnas, providing simple houses in 
Depok, was followed by other developers. The development became even faster when 
University of Indonesia developed its new campus in Depok in 1987 and when Jakarta-
Bogor double-track railway was built in 1992, crossing Depok. 
The population of Depok was about 100,000 in 1974; it grew to 233,799 in 1982 when 
Depok was granted the status of an administrative city. In 1999 Depok received a City 
status with a population of 1,143,403 people. The fast development of Depok City is 
inseparable with the role of Perumnas as the pioneer of simple housing development.  
 
1.6 Housing finance policy 
One of the important aspects in housing finance is the government subsidy. There are at 
least two forms of government support: firstly by establishing a company to provide 
houses, i.e. Perumnas. Secondly, the government provided support in the form of a 
funding institution, by establishing Bank Tabungan Negara (BTN), which focuses its 
business on house ownership credit for the people. 
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Table 5. Types of provision of housing assistance for low income society 
Housing assistance policy 
Target group Type of provision Related to credit 
scheme 
Not related to 
credit scheme 
Less than 350,000 Owned house 
• Self-initiated/ 
informal 
• Rental house 
• Economic 
empowerment 
• Micro credit for 
business 
• Micro credit for 
housing 
• Insurance/credit 
guarantor 
• Construction 
materials 
• Environmental 
quality 
enhancement 
• Subsidy 
• Fiscal 
Incentive 
• Land 
certification 
and Building 
Construction 
Permit 
350,000 – 500,000 Owned house 
• Formal 
• Self-initiated 
• Rusunawa 
 
• Down payment 
subsidy 
• Interest margin 
subsidy 
• Micro credit 
housing 
• Insurance/credit 
guarantor  
• Interest rate 
subsidy of 
construction credit  
• Construction 
materials 
• Environmental 
quality 
enhancement 
• Subsidized 
O&M 
• Fiscal 
Incentive 
• Land 
certification 
and Building 
Construction 
Permit 
500,000 – 900,000 Owned house 
• Formal 
• Self-initiated 
• Rusunawa 
• Down payment 
subsidy 
• Interest margin 
subsidy 
• Insurance/credit 
guarantor  
• Interest rate 
subsidy of 
construction credit 
• Limited 
subsidy 
• Construction 
cost 
• Subsidized 
O&M 
• Land 
certification 
and Building 
Construction 
Permit  
900,000 – 
1,500,000 
Owned house 
• Formal 
• Self-initiated 
• Rusunami 
• Down payment 
subsidy 
• Interest margin 
subsidy 
• Insurance/credit 
guarantor  
• Interest rate 
subsidy of 
construction credit 
• Fiscal 
Incentive 
• Limited PSU  
• Land 
certification 
and Building 
Construction 
Permit 
Source: Modified from Inforum, December 2005. 
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So that the government programme can work and subsidy can be channelled 
appropriately, there are several factors to be considered in the provision of housing for 
poor society groups.  
Firstly, there needs to be a reduction in the cost of acquiring land for housing through 
efficient access and reduction of transaction cost, reducing land speculators, using small 
parcels, cross subsidy and direct subsidy. Land, particularly in urban areas, is 
increasingly expensive. As a result, reasonable housing can only be constructed in the 
suburbs and the buyers have to provide transportation means or cost to reach their place 
of work in the town.  
For poor people working in the informal sector, transport costs can reduce their income 
significantly. Poor people will therefore stay in city centre and close to their work-place 
even if that means they have to live in slum areas. 
Secondly, provision of reasonable housing can only give small profit margin to 
developers. Consequently, to minimize production cost, the developers will use simple 
materials. Without proper oversight or a consumer complaint centre, developers will use 
sub-standard materials and it does not take very long before the buyers are forced to 
renovate their houses. Therefore, the government has to enforce a set of minimum 
standards for healthy simple houses. 
Thirdly, reasonable housing with small margin is not attractive to the electricity company, 
telecommunication service and drinking water providers. As a result, reasonable housing 
is not equipped with adequate infrastructure; even road infrastructure, which is the 
responsibility of the government, cannot be easily provided. 
Fourthly, reasonable housing with small profit margins can only bring maximum profit 
when developed on a large scale. Although demand is high, the people’s low purchasing 
power requires government subsidy, not only in the form of bank interest but also down 
payment. The next problem is that there are not many banks which channel funds large 
enough for affordable housing. It is more profitable for banks to provide credit for 
luxurious house ownership or expensive apartments thanks to the large profit margin. 
Finally, one of the unsettled issues is the fact that most members of society are not 
eligible to apply for credit. One of the main requirements to be granted credit is regular 
income, ownership of a Tax Payer’s Number, and other documents and administrative 
requirements. The information is required by the bank as a guarantee that the credit will 
be repaid. There is thus a problem with residents working in the informal sector and not 
meeting the administrative requirements of the banks. Similarly, it is also an issue for 
people with no fixed job and income. Therefore, some thinking has to be done regarding 
extension of access to banking credit, particularly in the streamlining of administrative 
requirements. 
 
1.7 Corruption and its impacts in the housing sector 
The whole world’s awareness of corruption has been increasing, particularly since the 
economic crisis that struck a number of countries in Asia. Corruption is no longer 
regarded as the grease of development, whose existence is needed to a certain extent. 
Corruption is not merely a crime and violation of law. Corruption is a distortion in public 
policy. Because of corruption, many policies addressing the interests of the general 
population are enjoyed by the elite.  
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Indonesia itself has experienced the bad impacts of corruption. The systemic corruption 
in Indonesia was the main factor behind the failure of its economy during the crisis of 
1997-1998. The economic miracle and model of development achievement as labelled in 
the official reports turned out to have been based on shallow foundation. When the crisis 
struck, the whole story of development success in Indonesia fell apart.  
Now, seven years after the economic crisis and the fall of the New Orde Administration, 
corruption is still an important issue in Indonesia. The ruling government is unable to 
eradicate corruption, which seems to have been part of the bureaucracy, economic and 
political systems in Indonesia. The fact that corruption in rampant in Indonesia can be 
seen in the corruption perception index survey. Table 6 shows the rank and score of 
Indonesia in the survey conducted by Transparency International. 
 
Table 6. Corruption Perception Index Survey 1998 - 2005 
Year Rank Sample Size Score 
1998 6 85  2.0 
1999 3 98  1.7 
2000 5 90  1.7 
2001 4 91  1.9 
2002 6 102  1.9 
2003 6 133  1.9 
2004 5 146  2.0 
2005 6 168 2.2 
   Source: Modified from Transparency International (www.transparency.org) 
 
Vito Tanzi, a World Bank researcher, concludes that corruption is a distortion to market 
and resource allocation because of its impacts19. Firstly, corruption decreases the 
capacity of the government to control projects and oversight to address market failure. 
Because of corruption, intervention from government that is expected to shape ideal 
market will direct profits to a few capitalists who can achieve monopoly and concessions 
through corrupt practices. 
Secondly, corruption distorts incentive initiatives. In many cases, in corrupt situations, 
economic actors will devote their energy to rent seeking and corrupt practices such as 
bribery to gain profit, instead of focusing on productive efforts.  
Thirdly, corruption is basically an additional tax beyond the official one. Particularly in a 
decentralized corruption situation as in Indonesia, all interested parties practise 
corruption. Eventually, the costs of bribery, grease money and others become an 
additional tax burdening the people. 
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Fourthly, corruption undermines the fundamental role of the government, particularly in 
rule of law. When somebody through corrupt practice can buy anything or change rules 
such as the city master plan for his/her interest, then there is no longer a rule of law. In 
the end, investment and business activities are no longer predictable. 
Fifthly, corruption delegitimizes democracy. Democracy can only work when there is rule 
of law. That way, the loss of rule of law due to corrupt practices will contribute to the 
deficit of democracy. 
Finally, corruption will increase poverty. Poverty is a question of access, so poor people 
are those who do not have enough access to food, education and information. In such a 
situation, poverty reduction projects will not reach their target and instead will enrich the 
project implementers.  
Corruption and the housing sector are interrelated problems in Indonesia, particularly 
because the small contribution made by the state in the provision of housing creates a 
big role for the private sector. Where corruption is rampant, state intervention will not 
achieve its expected objectives. The economic crisis of 1997-1998 was primarily caused 
by bad loans in the property sector. The boom in the property sector turned out to have 
been financed by short-term credit of the developers, while the property sector is actually 
a long-term investment. 
When rupiah was weakening in comparison to US dollar, a number of property credits 
turned bad. Bad loans led to the decrease of public confidence in the banks. As a result, 
there were massive savings withdrawals over a few days. As they did not have cash, 
banks turned to the Central Bank, Bank Indonesia, as the lender of last resort in the 
country’s banking system. Unfortunately, the liquidity assistance was not paid until now 
and has to be covered by the government through foreign debt and paid back by state 
budget. 
Bank Tabungan Negara, which had originally been established to channel credit in 
housing sector, did not escape the crisis. Before the crisis, BTN had shifted into 
channelling credit to corporates and the government had to restructure it. One of banks 
focusing on the property sector, Papan Sejahtera Bank, was even liquidated and the 
owner was a suspect in corruption case.   
Corrupt practices can also be seen in Perumnas. Instead of providing housing for middle 
to lower class people, Perumnas sold land to private developers to be turned into luxury 
housing. This corrupt practice not only made a loss for the state as the share holder, but 
poor people also felt the impact. Housing land that should be designated to the poor fell 
into the hands of the wealthy because of corruption. 
 
1.8 Case study of Jabotabek 
Research into a big city, especially megapolis like Jakarta, does not make an interesting 
case study. Because of the very large scale, there are many factors to be considered and 
these make it not commonly chosen as a case study. This happens not only at the level 
of study. Development programmes and pilot projects often avoid Jakarta because of the 
complexity of its problems which make it likely that they will fail. 
However, the central position Jakarta possesses in the country is distinctive from other 
regions. When problems in Jakarta are settled, some of the problems faced by Indonesia 
are also successfully settled. Every policy launched by the Jakarta city and Jabotabek 
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area governments will be the model for other Indonesian local governments to follow. In 
the field of transportation, for instance, the initiative of Jakarta city government to address 
congestion problems by providing priority bus or busway will be a model for other big 
cities to overcome congestion problems. 
On the issue of housing, the Jabotabek area is also very interesting. Jabotabek is the 
main target of urbanization in Jawa Island and Indonesia in general. People from different 
parts of the country come to Jabotabek to find jobs. Because of that, the demand for 
housing in Jabotabek is the highest in comparison to other city governments. In the same 
time, the problems that need to be overcome are more difficult than those faced by other 
local governments. 
The big problems faced by the city government eventually led them to some interesting 
breakthroughs, and so housing policy made by Jabotabek’s government, such as 
development of flats, will be a model for replication by other local governments in the 
future. In contrast, the achievements in other regions cannot necessarily be implemented 
in Jakarta. Because of the complexity of the problems, Jakarta will not take success 
stories from other cities in Indonesia but instead other big cities in other countries as 
models and comparisons. 
 
1.9 Research methodology 
The research used qualitative and descriptive methods. The research starts by 
describing government policy on housing and various corruption practices in the housing 
sector. The research also considered the experience of Solok District which managed to 
reduce corruption in licensing. The case of Solok is reviewed to assess its replicability in 
Jakarta. 
Data were obtained through secondary sources. The researcher collected documents 
related to the housing sector in the form of research reports, media coverage, books and 
internet sites. Data will be supplemented with in-depth interviews with resource people 
competent in their respective fields. In addition, focus group discussions were organized 
to sharpen the focus and report of the research.  
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2. Corruption in housing sector raises costs  
Two sectors playing important roles in the provision of housing for the poor are the 
government and private sector. The government, in this case, acts not only as the 
provider of infrastructure but also as the regulator. Through a number of state-owned 
companies, such as Perum Perumnas and Bank Tabungan Negara, the government 
provides a source of funds and fixed assets (land) for housing construction. Meanwhile 
the Ministry of People’s Housing has been established to design housing policy 
comprising issues of settlement, a city plan, sanitation, a housing funding scheme, and 
quality standards for healthy and decent homes. 
In the private sector (developers and financial institutions), the drive to be engaged and 
participate to help develop housing sector for the poor is stimulated by different facilities 
and subsidized credits aimed to maintain the margin of profit – despite this being at the 
minimum level. If the profit rate in the business of providing housing for the poor is not 
maintained, the private sector will automatically be unable to contribute to the 
development of housing for the poor. Instead, they will focus only on the development of 
shopping malls, real estate, luxury apartments and different types of properties that bring 
maximum profit. 
In Jakarta, for example, the symptom can be seen in the development of apartments. As 
a general comparison, the development of luxury apartments in Jakarta in the nine years 
to 2004 reached a figure of 45 thousand units. The rate of flat development for the 
previous 20 years was just 800 units per year or 16 thousand units in total. In the same 
time, the private developers managed to develop an average of 1,500 apartments per 
year. The demand for lower to middle class apartments is 10 thousand units per year at 
minimum, much larger than the demand for luxury apartments for upper middle class, 
which is estimated to be no more than 2 thousand units per year.20 
Although the scenario of housing sector development, particularly for the poor, has been 
designed in such a way, the rate of success in meeting the demand of the poor for 
homes is relatively very low. The problem is mainly the poor management of assets and 
financial resources in the state-owned company, Perum Perumnas, in particular, as 
corrupt practices are rampant and licensing bureaucracy creates a high cost economy for 
the developers. The expensive licensing cost has been highlighted by developers, as 
raised by Real Estate Indonesia (REI) in different occasions.21  
 
2.1 High-cost licensing practice  
In general, the World Bank defines corruption as the abuse of authority by public officials 
to get personal gains such as – but not limited to – state money embezzlement, 
nepotism, bribery and blackmail. Corruption in itself is difficult to measure and observe as 
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 Panangian Simanungkalit, 2004, Fenomena Gaya Hidup, Investasi dan Booming Apartemen 
(Lifestyle Phenomenon, Investment and Booming of Apartment) in ‘Bisnis Properti Menuju Crash 
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it is always done discreetly. Nevertheless, many institutions or parties try to develop 
methodology and instruments to formulate corruption indicators, such as those 
conducted by Transparency International (TI) by using the public perception survey. 
The definition of corruption from more sociological perspective is proposed by Syed 
Hussein Alatas (1990: 3-4) as quoted by Azyumardi Azra22. According to Alatas, 
‘corruption is the abuse of trust in the interest of private gain’. In this notion, Alatas 
develops several typology of corruption. 
First, ‘the transactive corruption’ takes place as an agreement between a donor and a 
recipient for mutual benefit. 
Second, ‘extortive corruption’ involves pressure and force to avoid danger to those 
implicated or people close to the perpetrators.  
Third, ‘investive corruption’ is started by offering/temptation that serves as an 
‘investment’ anticipating future benefit.  
Fourth, ‘nepotistic corruption’ takes place in the form of special treatment both in 
appointment to public office and granting projects to families members.  
Fifth, ‘autogenic corruption’ takes place when an individual official gains advantage when 
s/he has insider’s information on different public policies s/he has to keep confidential.  
Sixth, ‘supportive corruption’ is protection or strengthening of existing corruption through 
intrigue of power or even coercion. 
Meanwhile Farida Rahmawati also categorizes corruption into a number of types.23 The 
first type is known as administrative corruption, which is a practice of abuse of authority, 
law, rules and public regulations for private interest conducted by government officials. 
The second type is called corruption of procurement of public goods and services, which 
is the misuse of public resources or funding commonly done by public officials or 
economic agents. The third type is state capture: referring more to the acts of economic 
agents or corporates both in public or private sectors to influence the legal system or 
government regulations for personal gains.  
She further adds that the forms of low-level administrative corruption (bureaucratic 
corruption) can be the following: 
• Bribery to government officials to ‘bend’ the rules; 
• Deliberate abuse of organizations and rules; 
• Abuse of authority in licensing and inspection for blackmailing. 
From the conceptual explanation mentioned above, the practice of making extra charges 
in the housing development licensing process, which leads to high cost economy, can be 
categorized as part of administrative corruption. Meanwhile, sociologically the 
phenomenon can be classified as extortive corruption as the private sector (developers) 
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must provide a certain amount of fund (either legally or illegally) to obtain the licence. 
Without following the mechanism, business activities will not run smoothly.  
The connection between corrupt practices in business licensing and economic growth 
can be seen in a number of assumptions as follows:  
• Corruption cripples foreign and domestic investment because rent-seeking increases 
costs and creates unnecessary expenditures, lowering incentives for both foreign and 
domestic investors.  
• Corruption burdens business cost as businesspeople need licences to run their 
businesses. To obtain permits and licences, they have to bribe and therefore reduce 
the business’s rate of profit. 
• Corruption decreases the quality of public infrastructure as public resources are 
shifted for the use of private interest, for which standard of quality no longer exists 
and budget allocated for operational and maintenance costs become a rent seeking 
arena. 
• Corruption decreases tax revenue as the companies and their activities are pushed 
to the grey area by being provided tax reduction through back-door mechanism.24 
From the results of a number of World Bank surveys on corruption the connection 
between corruption and economic growth can be described, i.e.: 
• Corruption has decreased the domestic investment rate. For instance, in Bulgaria, 
one in four business activities taken as a survey sample has planned to expand their 
business but failed to do so, and corruption is one of the important factors. A study in 
Latvia also shows that because of corruption investors cancelled their investment 
plans. This is attributed to the high costs related to business licences and uncertainty, 
including illegal charges which when calculated could reach a figure of 28 per cent of 
total investment. 
• Corruption has threatened businesspeople, especially the small business community. 
A number of studies report that the small business sector tends to pay the most for 
bribery (particularly in Bosnia, Ghana and Slovakia).  
• Corruption has decreased the tax revenue. In Bangladesh, more than 30 per cent of 
urban population reported that they paid less for their electricity and water bills by 
bribing the officials. In a number of studies, the respondents are more willing to pay 
tax if corrupt practices can be controlled.25 
For Indonesia in particular, the poor business environment can be observed from the 
World Bank survey entitled ‘Doing Business in 2005, East Asian Profile’ conducted in 124 
countries. In a comparison of the number of procedures taken to start a business, 
Indonesia and China are placed first with 12 procedures. 
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Figure 1. Number of procedures to start a business 
 
Apart from the number and length of procedures, the time to start a business in Indonesia 
is also quite long, i.e. 151 days, whereas in Cambodia the process takes only 95 days. 
The figure revealed by the survey is the official time to take official procedures. In 
practice, obtaining business or construction licence may take years, as complained about 
by developers who are about to develop housing.  
The cost of starting a business is also an issue in itself. Indonesia is placed second from 
the bottom, as the licensing bureaucracy brings consequences in terms of increased 
cost. Again, the survey covered what was formally stipulated in different regulations. This 
means the cost excludes the expenditure of bribing or paying public officials/employees 
to make the business activity start smoothly. 
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Figure 2. Time taken to start a business 
 
 
Figure 3. Cost of starting a business (GNIpc is national income per capita) 
  
The issue of illegal charges and maladministration in the public service sector can 
actually be observed from the results of a Transparency International Indonesia (TII) 
survey in 2005. In the report of Corruption Perception Index (IPK) and Bribe Payer Index 
(OPS) as surveyed in 21 regions in Indonesia with businesspeople as respondents, 
conclusions drawn are as follows: 
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• Based on direct interaction, the institution they do most interaction with are Tax 
Service (1095 resp.) and Business Licensing (936). Only a few have projects with the 
World Bank or other Grants. Meanwhile most corrupt interactions take place in 
Customs.  
• In Jakarta particularly, 502 interactions of bribery were found to have been conducted 
in the licensing sector by 84 agents.  
• Corruption interaction is identified if a respondent admits to have been asked for 
bribes for the requested service, or to have offered bribes. The amount of money per 
transaction was revealed to be in the range of IDR 375 thousand and IDR 150 
million. 
 
Figure 4. Incidence of corruption in the public service sector  
Source: Transparency International Indonesia, 2005 
 
Apparently the issue related to bribery practices in the licensing sector is a never-ending 
problem that continued from year to year. Referring to the data of TII of the previous year 
(2004), public institutions serving Registration and Licensing were also revealed as very 
corrupt, scoring 3.7 or D plus, similar to the business world. Bribery is rampant as there is 
a ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ mechanism.  
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Table 7. Indonesian Corruption Barometer 2004 
No. Sector and Institution Public Opinion Score 
1 Political Party 4.4 
2 DPR (National House of Representatives) 4.4 
3 Customs 4.3 
4 Court and judiciary 4.2 
5 Police 4.2 
6 Tax 4 
7 Business/Private Sector  3.7 
8 Registration and Licensing Service  3.7 
9 Military 3.3 
10 Education 3.2 
11 Public Works 3.1 
12 Health 3 
13 Media 2.6 
14 NGO 2.4 
15 Religious Institutions 1.8 
 
In 2003, the Indonesian Corruption Barometer released by TII also described the 
condition of bribery in the licensing sector, which was placed the seventh worst of 13 
sectors surveyed with a score of 5.8. The highest position was dominated by the judiciary 
sector, scoring 32.8.  
 
Table 8. Indonesian Corruption Barometer 2003 
No. Sector and Institution Public Opinion Score 
1 Court and judiciary 32.8 
2 Political party 16.3 
3 Public works 11.1 
4 Police 10.2 
5 Education 8.7 
6 Tax office 6.4 
7 Business Licence 5.8 
8 Customs 3.2 
9 Business 2.8 
10 Health 1.8 
11 Others 0.7 
12 Immigration 0.4 
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The corrupt practices in the management of state companies and the licensing policy that 
creates difficulties for developers have at least caused some impacts that make the 
cheap home policy difficult to implement.  
Firstly, inefficiency and the high level of leakage that eventually lead to an unhealthy 
company makes it difficult for Perum Perumnas (Perusahaan Umum Pembangunan 
Perumahan Nasional, the Public Company of National Housing Development) to achieve 
its objectives. According to the Government Regulation No. 15 Year 2004 concerning 
Perum Perumnas, Article 6 provides that the purposes of the establishment of the 
Company are: 
• To carry out the management of housing and settlements for the community;  
• In certain matters, to carry out tasks given by the Government in order to fulfil the 
demand for housing for the low income group of the community.  
Further it is provided that the objective of the Company is to make available housing and 
settlements that are decent and affordable, based on the master plan that supports 
sustainable regional development. From this it is clear that the existence of Perum 
Perumnas is purely intended to facilitate development of housing, particularly for the 
middle to lower class. 
Secondly, it is difficult to encourage the participation of the private sector housing 
development facility for the poor because of the high licensing cost.  
Thirdly, the loss of opportunity for the poor to enjoy and get an adequate and healthy 
housing. As those constraints are structural, an effort to make a reform is important, 
especially on matters related to bureaucratic facility, increasing transparency and more 
substantial accountability mechanism. 
 
2.2 Corrupt practice allegations in Perum Perumnas 
Perum Perumnas, as the state-owned company assigned by the Government to develop 
people’s housing and its surrounding facility in the urban area, was established on July 
18, 1974 through Government Regulation Number 29/1974 as amended by Government 
Regulation Number 12 Year 1988. The Government Regulation is now renewed into 
Government Regulation Number 15 Year 2004.  
As stated by its mission, Perum Perumnas has to be able to mobilize the development of 
housing and settlement in order to promote guided and controlled regional development 
and to realize the improvement of the quality of life of the community at large.  
Other missions are to carry out the development of housing and settlements in new areas 
or in regional rejuvenation, producing homes that are decent and affordable for middle to 
low income community (public service obligation) as well as to create business 
opportunities and employment. In addition, Perum Perumnas has to be able to gain profit 
based on the principle of sound corporate management so as to be able to grow and 
develop.26 
Therefore, there are three important aspects that become the focus of Perum 
Perumnas’s missions, i.e. the aspect of urban and environmental master plan control, the 
consumer aspect, and Good Corporate Governance (GCG) that promotes efficiency, 
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profit and business sustainability. Considering those missions, the main goal of Perum 
Perumnas is the provision of decent housing for middle to lower group of the community. 
In other words, Perum Perumnas is the servant to the fulfilment of community’s basic 
rights to get decent housing. 
To support the agenda, the Government has invested capital separated from the State 
Budget to Perum Perumnas in different forms, ranging from liquid funds, fixed assets 
(buildings, houses) and land. On December 31, 2001, the asset of Perum Perumnas was 
IDR 431,673,246,588 (four hundred thirty one billion six hundred seventy three million 
two hundred forty six thousand five hundred eighty eight rupiah); the asset owned by 
Perum Perumnas comprises:27 
a) The capital for company establishment obtained in 1974 of IDR1,000,000,000 (one 
billion rupiah).  
b) Additional placement of state capital coming from the State Budget of 1975/1976 until 
1990/1991 of IDR 212,090,765,190 (two hundred twelve billion ninety million seven 
hundred sixty five thousand one hundred ninety rupiah).  
c) Conversion of lending as former cost of World Bank consultant/s into additional 
placement of state capital obtained in 1982 of IDR3,658,072,126 (three billion six 
hundred fifty eight million seventy two thousand one hundred twenty six rupiah). 
d) The fund for the development of rental flats (Rusunawa) obtained in 1994 until 2001 
of IDR194,330,769,594 (one hundred ninety four billion three hundred thirty million 
seven hundred sixty nine thousand five hundred ninety four rupiah).  
e) The fund from the selling of ex NV. Volkshuisvesting houses obtained in 1991 until 
2001 of IDR 8,080,565,400 (eight billion eighty million five hundred sixty five 
thousand four hundred rupiah).  
f) State Wealth in the form of Wood Production Unit of Suriakencana in Cibadak, 
Sukabumi and Wood Processing Unit in Semarang that was stated as additional 
placement of state capital through the Government Regulation Number 7 Year 1988 
of IDR 4,800,000,000 (forty billion eight million rupiah). 
Lands in: 
a) Klender, of 150 Ha, and Cengkareng, of 144 Ha, obtained in 1975 of 
IDR 2,476,681,086 (two billion four hundred seventy six million six hundred eighty 
one thousand eighty six rupiah). 
b) Depok, of 112.977 Ha, obtained in 1975 with the value of IDR 671,739,192 (six 
hundred seventy one million seven hundred thirty nine thousand one hundred ninety 
two rupiah). 
c) Bekasi, of 62.56 Ha, that was determined as additional placement of state capital 
through the Government Regulation Number 29 Year 1994 with the value of IDR 
4,564,654,000 (four billion five hundred sixty four million six hundred fifty four 
thousand rupiah). 
From the data, the assets of Perum Perumnas seem very small. But this is mainly 
because of the method of asset calculation using as a reference the basic price when 
they were obtained. If the asset is converted to the real value in the present, the asset of 
                                                   
27
 Government Regulation Number 15 Tahun 2004 tentang Perum Perumnas 
  26
Perum Perumnas will surely be multiplied from the figure mentioned in Government 
Regulation number 15 Year 2004. 
Apparently Perum Perumnas meets many obstacles to achieving its mission. In the note 
of Suwito Santoso, in Jakarta the rate of development of housing for upper middle class 
outnumbers the rate of development of simple housing for middle to lower class.  
In his calculation, in 2005-2006, when the construction of apartments is completed, there 
will be an addition of about 25 thousand apartments. Similarly with the shopping centre, 
in 2006 there will be 10 other buildings in the shopping centre with a capacity of more 
than 100 thousand units of stores. Meanwhile, as seen in the composition and statistics 
of the Jakarta population, the number of inhabitants classified as middle to lower class is 
much larger that the upper middle class. 
At the same time, the development of simple houses as well as simple flats can be said 
to show no meaningful growth. Property for the middle to lower class is barely made 
available by developers. The blow of economic crisis made the costs of construction 
materials soar and this exacerbates the condition of the needy with regards to the need 
for homes.28  
Although the development of housing for the poor was done before the crisis, it was not 
supported with adequate infrastructure so that the areas of housing complex developed 
cannot be expected to grow into new urban areas. This makes big cities cramped by 
millions of people. If the development of the simple housing was supported by the 
development of adequate infrastructure such as water installation, electricity and 
transportation, it would ensure that the middle to lower class community who provide a 
living for their family in the central areas of the city would be consolidated.29 
The absence of infrastructure support causing the low occupancy rate of housing for 
middle to lower class of community leads to the low productivity of Perum Perumnas as 
the provider of land as well as housing. This problem triggered the problem of the lands 
owned of Perum Perumnas left vacant in the past several years.  
A situation like this makes inevitable the use of Perum Perumnas land by the lower class 
of community who do not own land and homes. The increasingly high cost of land in the 
urban areas and the low productivity of land asset of Perum Perumnas become the 
triggers of violation conducted by the management of Perum Perumnas by practising 
land trading and renting to businesspeople.  
Because of this, it is not surprising that the practice of eviction by the apparatus of 
Jakarta administration conducted at the request of Perum Perumnas are common in 
several places. The biggest eviction happened in 2003 in Kampung Baru, Cengkareng 
where 1,500 Heads of Family in the area were forced to leave land owned by Perum 
Perumnas.30  
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This is surely an ironic condition as one of the missions of Perum Perumnas is to become 
the provider of homes for the middle to lower class, rather than to evict in its own name. 
What is concerning is that Perum Perumnas had to spend a budget of IDR 12 billion to 
finance the eviction process.31 
Financially, the condition of Perum Perumnas is actually not bad. Before the fall of Perum 
Perumnas in the period of 1993 through 1998, the spending for salary of its employees 
was taken from the interest of its bank deposits. This indicates that Perum Perumnas has 
a surplus. But the allegation of corrupt practices undermined this state-owned company 
and made the financial performance of the company unsound. As a result, the short-term 
loan of about IDR 859 billion rupiah in the period of 1993-1998 had to be borne.  
In 1998, the Attorney General of Indonesia through Jampidsus (Deputy Attorney on 
Special Crimes) conducted an inquiry to investigate the allegation of corruption against 
the Directors of Perum Perumnas in the period of 1993-1998 related to a number of 
cases. Among others were the use of commercial lending that was not in line with its 
appropriation, development of housing with a business partner that brought a loss to 
Perum Perumnas, choice of land location with economic value, mark-up of land purchase 
price, mark-down of the volume of land filling, and distortion of project tenders in a 
number of locations. These cases have also been reported by Sekar Perumnas, in union 
with Perum Perumnas and Indonesia Corruption Watch, to the Attorney General of RI. 
However, similar with other corruption cases, the inquiry and investigation conducted by 
the Attorney General was terminated with the issuance to stop the investigation (Surat 
Perintah Penghentian Penyidikan). 
The bankruptcy suffered by Perum Perumnas with the loan burden in 1998 reaching 
IDR 859 billion forced the sale of a part of the asset of Perumnas, based on the decision 
of Board of Directors. One among others that later created problem was the selling of 
Perumnas land in Cengkareng, in which corruption allegedly took place and could bring 
loss to Perum Perumnas by as much as billions of rupiah.  
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3. Housing in Jabotabek 
Apart from being the capital city and centre of government, Jakarta is also the centre of 
economy of the country as well as the engine of economic growth. Therefore, Jakarta 
becomes the city with the fastest development. The economy makes Jakarta the main 
target of job seekers from across the country. Annually it is estimated that around 
200,000 people from different regions, especially in Java, come and increase the number 
of workforce in Jakarta.  
The population of Jakarta in 2005 reached 8.3 million people, while those of the whole 
area of Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, Bekasi and Cianjur reached 23.03 million 
people. Table 9 shows the detail of population in the area of Jabodetabek  Metropolitan 
and Cianjur.  
 
Table 9. Detail of population in the area of Jabodetabek 
Region Area (km2) Population 
DKI Jakarta 661.52 8,356,489 
City of Bogor 118.50 743,086 
District of Bogor 2,388.93 3,489,096 
City of Depok 200.29 1,146,047 
City of Tangerang 184 1,311,585 
District of Tangerang 1,110.38 2,775,325 
City of Bekasi 210.49 1,639,042 
District of Bekasi 1,065.35 1,642,875 
District of Cianjur 3,467.12 1,931,006 
Source: Demographic Census 2000 (Kompas, 19/12/2005). 
 
While Jakarta is the centre of government and economy, the other regions act as 
supporting zone. As the supporting zone, Tangerang, Bekasi and Bogor provide land and 
facility for farming, industry, trade and housing.  
The big population and workforce in Jakarta lead to increasing need for housing. Land 
prices are getting more and more expensive and housing in Jakarta becomes 
unaffordable for the majority of those who work in the capital. This situation encourages 
the emergence of housing areas in the outskirt of Jakarta, such as in Tangerang, Bekasi 
and Bogor, which grow into a dense settlement area with affordable prices. 
Some areas on the outskirts of Jakarta, originally rural areas like Depok, Ciputat and 
Pondok Gede, eventually changed into settlement areas. The outflowing population of 
Jakarta also makes other areas around Jakarta, such as Serpong, Karawaci, Cikarang, 
and Cimanggis, become areas of settlement, trade and service. Areas like Serpong, 
Karawaci and Cikarang have even developed into separate cities with their own facilities. 
Iskandar Saleh in his dissertation describes the hierarchy of the area of Jabodetabek 
Metropolitan in Table 10. 
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Table 10. Urban Hierarchy of Jabotabek Metropolitan 
Jabotabek 
City hierarchy  
Jakarta Bogor Tangerang Bekasi 
Centre Jakarta    
Centre Level I  Bogor Tangerang Bekasi 
Centre Level II  Depok Ciputat Pondok Gede 
Centre Level III  Cimanggis 
Cibinong 
Citeureup 
Ciampea 
Cinere 
Pondok Aren 
Cikupa 
Serpong 
Balaraja 
Sepatan 
Teluk Naga 
Legok/Curug 
Tambun 
Cikarang 
Lemah Abang 
Babelan 
Source: Saleh, 1999. 
 
3.1 Transportation 
The fast development of settlement areas in the outskirts of Jakarta, however, creates a 
new problem that cannot be easily overcome, i.e. transportation. Millions of people who 
live in the outskirts and suburbs of Jakarta travel to the city in the morning and back in 
the evening. Traffic congestion is a regular sight in Jakarta, especially in the morning and 
evening. The traffic is exacerbated by the absence of good public transport provision by 
Jakarta city administration. As a result, whenever possible, people choose to use private 
cars and motorcycles, which lead to worse traffic in Jakarta. 
The Governor of Jakarta, Sutiyoso, has launched Macro Transportation Pattern (MTP) in 
2001. This will integrate four transportation infrastructures, i.e. priority bus or busway, 
light rail transit (monorail), mass rapid transportation (subway system) and river 
transportation. MTP will be completed in 2007 or 2010 at the latest. Based on World 
Bank guidelines, busway investment is as much as USD 2 - 5 million per kilometre, 
monorail USD 20-25 million per kilometre and subway system USD 45 - 105 million32.   
The MTP planned by Jakarta Governor will add to various existing modes of transport, 
i.e. train, city buses, medium-size buses (metro mini) and many kinds of other public 
transports. Apart from those owned by the government, like Perum PPD, most public 
transport is managed by the private sector. The problems are that they are far from 
decent. Rampant crimes on public transports, overcrowded with passengers, including 
those sitting on the roof of electric trains, and frustrating traffic congestion are reasons 
why the government created MTP. 
However, no matter how large the mass transportation infrastructure is constructed, it will 
not be able to overcome the problem as long as the various basic problems are not 
addressed. Firstly, mass transportation only connects areas within Jakarta city whereas 
what contribute to the congestion are the private vehicles of the population entering the 
Jakarta city every day. This means that mass transportation will only make a difference 
when it can connect the city centre with settlement areas in the outskirts of Jakarta. 
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Secondly, most people cannot afford housing in the city, so they live in the suburbs and 
become the cause of congestion through their daily journeys of coming in and out of the 
city. Until the government provides incentive and subsidy to reduce the cost of housing in 
the city, people will still be concentrated in the suburban of Jakarta. 
Thirdly, various plans of city management will not be effective if the Jakarta Governor can 
only have limited authority. It is timely that Jakarta management is changed into 
Megapolitan because Jakarta and its surrounding cities have practically merged. The 
areas of Bogor, Tangerang, Bekasi and Cianjur have merged with the outskirts of 
Jakarta. When managed separately and not coordinated well, many problems will not be 
settled. 
Finally, Jakarta will always be the target of urbanization if the long-term economic 
development policy does not succeed in fostering new economic centres outside Jakarta. 
Poor people will leave their villages and towns and move to Jakarta if infrastructure and 
other incentives for economic growth are not provided by the government, be it national 
or local. So far, economic development has been concentrated in Jakarta and has made 
it an area in the country that has high economic growth. 
Economic growth will encourage the emergence of both service and manufacturing 
industries. The existence of industry creates a demand for workers. Unfortunately, not all 
workers coming to Jakarta have adequate skills to be accommodated by the formal 
sector. Some of the population moving to Jakarta enter the informal sector. Then, the 
next problem arises, i.e. the emergence of street peddlers that cannot be easily 
regulated, and slum settlement in Jakarta. 
 
3.2 Flooding 
Flooding in parts of the city when rainy season comes is another problem Jakarta has. 
Geographically, Jakarta is a lowland with an average of 0-2 per cent of slope elevation; 
therefore, topographically, Jakarta is categorized as lowland shore and 60 per cent valley 
and hilly land. There are 13 rivers both natural and non-natural passing Jakarta; 10 of 
them flow to the Jakarta gulf. The rivers passing the city are Mookervaart, Anke, Grogol, 
Pesanggrahan, Krukut, Kalibaru Barat, Ciliwung, Klaibaru Timur, Cipingan, Sunter, 
Buaran, Jatikramat, and Cakung.  
Besides rivers there are also bodies of water which were naturally formed, i.e. lake or 
pool, though some have now been filled in, or artificial in the form of reservoir. The pools 
existing in South Jakarta were Babakan Pool, Mangga Bolong Pool and Ulujami Swamp. 
In East Jakarta there were Rorotan, Kelapa Dua Wetan and Dongkal swamps, while 
North Jakarta had Rawa Kendal pool. The total area of the bodies of water was 152 ha. 
Meanwhile, the big reservoirs in Jakarta are Pluit, East Sunter III, East Sunter I, North 
Sunter (North Jakarta), West Tomang, Wijayakusuma, Grogol (West Jakarta) and 
Setiabudi (Central Jakarta). 
In the Dutch colonial era, the city of Jakarta was actually designed like Amsterdam with a 
lot of canals. Besides imitating the Dutch city, the canal development was meant to 
prevent flooding. However, after the Indonesia got its independence and Jakarta 
developed rapidly into a metropolitan city, a lot of canals were closed. Now, some of the 
canals have been turned into settlement areas. As a result, North Jakarta has regularly 
suffered from flooding.  
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Moreover, Jakarta experienced big floods in 1996 and 2002. In the 2002 flood, 365,435 
people were forced to flee. In the city of Jakarta, the flood took 46 lives, while 22,860 
were sick and 13,000 suffered from diarrhoea. Bekasi was also hit by the flood and there 
were six casualties.  Almost 25 per cent of Jakarta was inundated. North Jakarta was the 
area hit the hardest, where an area of 76.881 ha was inundated followed by West Jakarta 
with around 5420 ha. The flood also cut 17,000 telephone connections, inundated and 
damaged 1,570 electrical stations, causing a financial loss over 40 million. Apart from 
covering the main streets of the city, the flood also damaged 100 km of streets in the city 
and 218 school buildings33. 
Why has flooding become a regular disaster in Jakarta, with two big floods in 1996 and 
2002 inundating a quarter of the city area? There are several factors explaining this 
matter. Firstly, the early warning system does not work well. The meteorological office, 
BMG, had already warned the Jakarta government, both in 1996 and 2002, that the 
rainfall was very high. But the city government ignored it and only allocated small amount 
of fund. In the Provincial Budget of 2002, the provincial government allocated IDR 294 
billion, which was only 4 billion higher than the previous year’s budget in spite of the 
warning from BMG on the danger of flood. Consequently, when the flood hit the city, only 
54 rubber boats were available. Out of the 144 water pumps, only 106 were working34. 
The second factor is the changing function of land. Formerly, the sea shores of Jakarta 
were an area of mangrove but there is dense settlement. Hence, the swamps that 
functioned as water reservoir no longer exist and the water runs into the settlement. 
Jakarta’s water was also retained in the pools. But just like the mangrove, the lakes have 
turned into settlement. Table 11 shows the pools that have shrunk or changed function. 
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Table 11. Bodies of water in Jakarta that have changed function 
Region Name Area Condition 
Rorotan Swamp 
 
50 ha No longer exists, filled in and turned 
into settlement 
Kendal Swamp 20 ha No longer exists. The provincial 
government will rebuild in 2010. 
Pluit Dam  On a part of its area was developed 
a building, i.e. Pluit Mega Mall. 
North Jakarta  
Canal Food  On a part of its area were 
developed buildings, among others 
in Muara Karang Condominium. 
East Jakarta  Penggilingan Swamp 
 
 
 
5 ha The remaining area is 1 as it has 
changed function into settlement 
and industrial areas (Jakarta 
Industrial Estate of Pulo Gadung) 
Ulujami Swamp 10 ha No longer exists, filled in and turned 
into settlement. In 2010 a water 
reservoir of 8 ha will be developed. 
Babakan Pool 32 ha Area shrank into 17 ha, other 
changed into settlement. 
South Jakarta  
Mangga Bolong Pool 16 ha The remaining area is 12 ha. 
Source: ISJ, 2003: 157 
 
The floods in Jakarta were also attributed to the changing function of water catching 
areas. In the areas appropriated as green belt to catch water, there have been 
constructed luxurious building or settlement areas. The changing function of mangroves 
into Indah Kapuk Beach luxurious area in North Jakarta, among others, contributed to the 
phenomenon of flood as a periodic disaster. Not only striking the settlement outside the 
real estate, flood often also inundates the toll road that is the only access to the 
Soekarto-Hatta International Airport.  
 
Table 12. Catching areas in Jakarta that have changed function 
Region Catching area 
North Jakarta Indah Kapuk Beach Housing 
Kelapa Gading Housing 
Sunter Industrial Area 
South Jakarta Mulia Hotel 
Pondok Indah Hospital 
West Jakarta Taman Anggrek Condominium 
Puri Indah Housing and Business Centre 
Source: ISJ, 2003: 157. 
 
The changing function of catching areas into settlements also took place on the outskirts 
of Jakarta, i.e. Bogor District. In the mountainous area that is supposed to be the 
catching, many villas and tourism centres were developed. As a result, water from Bogor 
directly flows into the rivers and finally increases the water volume in Jakarta and causes 
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flood. The alteration of buffer area of Jakarta as in Bogor was attributed to the absence of 
coordination between Jakarta and Bogor District Governments. Therefore, the idea to 
establish the Jakarta Megapolitan area by bringing the buffer area of Jakarta into one 
management or coordination is a must.  
Water catching areas, which are supposed to be a public and social facility, were not 
commonly made available by the real estate and property developers. Out of the 162 
Letters of Permit of Land Use Appropriation (Surat Ijin Peruntukan Penggunaan Tanah, 
SIPPT) issued to the real estate developers, only 41 SIPPT’s have submitted social and 
public facilities. The rest, 121 SIPPTs have not developed water catching areas as social 
and public facilities. While from the property sector, only 6 out of 179 SIPPTs issued 
have developed water catching area. Total deficiency of social and public facilities in the 
property sector reaches 38 ha35. 
One of the causes of the changing function of land and city planning is actually the 
practice of corruption. The city plan became disorganized as long-term planning was 
disregarded by corrupt policies. The areas that are supposed to function as catching 
areas had to function as trade areas because they are located in strategic places. Behind 
the alteration and inconsistency of city plan, there is no other reason that gives better 
explanation but corrupt practices.  
Among other cases that attracted media attention in 2005 was corruption allegation of 
State Secretariat’s assets. One of the Secretariat’s assets is Senayan area, which 
according to the city plan of Jakarta was supposed to be a green, water catching area, 
and the lung of the city. Several hotels have now been built in Senayan, including the 
Hilton Hotel. It was revealed later that there was a corruption allegation and some people 
have been named the suspects in early 2006, from among hotel owners as well as 
officials at the State Secretariat. 
One of the solutions is to develop the East Canal Flood (Banjir Kanal Timur, BKT), 
adding to the existing West Canal Flood (Banjir Kanal Barat, BKB). BKT will 
accommodate water from rivers and alter the flow so that it will not enter the city of 
Jakarta. BKB accommodates and alters the water flows from Ciliwung, Krukut, Kalibaru 
Barat rivers while BKT will retain water from Cipinang, Sunter, Buaran, Jati Kramat and 
Cakung rivers. The water channels of BKT will be developed along 23.6 km of 100 m 
width with 36 m new inspection roads on the left and right sides, and passing through 13 
subdistricts in North and East Jakarta. 
To Kompas Daily36 the Project Manager of BKT from the Department of Public Works, 
Pitoyo Subandrio, said that BKT was not everything. The development of BKT will not 
automatically prevent the flood that has become the annual ritual of Jakarta. When the 
development of BKT is completed in 2008 or in 2010 at the latest, what can be handled 
will only be flooding in East Jakarta area and some part of North Jakarta. Other problems 
contributing to flooding, according to Pitoyo, is the habit of the community who often 
throw away garbage into the rivers, which blocks them and causes a flood. 
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The other solution taken by the city government is forced eviction of the settlement on the 
river banks. There is a large poor community who, as they cannot afford a house near 
their workplace, are forced to settle on river banks. Consequently, the rivers get narrower 
and this becomes one of the causes of flooding. The Jakarta Government has tackled 
this by forced eviction. Regrettably, the city government is regarded as being inconsistent 
and unfair as the forced eviction was directed towards the poor only. On the other hand, 
the changing function of open green space into real estates and trade centres were not 
subject to sanction, let alone eviction.  
 
3.3 Housing in Jakarta 
Eviction is one among other social problems taking place often in, both eviction of 
squatter settlement and eviction of street peddlers. The eviction is conducted by the 
provincial government in order to impose city order.  
Specifically, the last eviction of residents was related to flooding. One of the causes of 
flood, according to the city government, is the fact that there is dense population living on 
the river banks. As the consequence, the river clogs up and the water overflows when 
heavy rains pour water to Jakarta rivers. The slum settlement was also often considered 
as a centre of crime and poverty. Because of that, the Jakarta City Government enforces 
Regional Regulation Number 11 Year 1998 concerning Public Order. 
However, according to Jakarta Social Institute’s study, out of 16 evictions in 2001 only 
two cases of eviction were judged as having some relevance with violation of the 
aforementioned Regional Regulation on public order. For the rest, although the Regional 
Regulation number 11/1998 was used the action was taken because of land dispute 
between the community and a corporation. 
Apart from the various motives behind eviction, the measures were connected to the 
capacity and obligation of Jakarta city government to provide homes for its residents. The 
residents are forced to settle in slum settlements, on river banks or below an overpass as 
they do not have access to housing. If they could choose, surely they would live in a 
healthy house. Circumstances have forced them to do otherwise. According to the 
Minister of People’s Housing, M. Yusuf Asy’ari, Jakarta has changed into the biggest 
slums, followed by big cities in Java Island37. 
Such a situation forces the provincial government to provide housing for its residents. It is 
estimated that in 2015 Jakarta will be home to around 10.4 million people. In the past ten 
years there has been a demand of 700,000 homes or 70,000 homes every year. On the 
other hand, Jakarta has only 39,691 ha of land for housing so that flats are the 
alternative. In the present days, the ratio between landed house and flats is 60:40 38. 
With the ratio of 60:40, the need for 700,000 homes is fulfilled with 420,000 landed house 
and 280,000 flats. This way, annually the Jakarta Provincial Government should develop 
or give incentive for the development of 28,000 flats. Out of 28,000 flats built annually 
during 2005-2015, upper-class flats or luxury apartment make 20 per cent of them and 
annually 5,600 should be developed . Middle class flats make 40 per cent of the supply 
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and 11,200 units need to be provided. The same amount of low-class flats are needed 39. 
However, this calculation seems to be difficult for the Jakarta Government to fulfil.  
Based on the Letter of Decision of the Governor Number 540, in every purchase of land 
over 5000 m2, 20 per cent of it has to be allocated for flat development. Just like other 
policies, however, there is no monitoring and law enforcement upon that regulation. As a 
result, since 1998 there have been 163 developers that do not carry out their obligation to 
build flats40. 
One of the problems making the development of flats difficult is that there is no incentive 
provided by the Local Government for developers. The real estate businesspeople are 
therefore more interested in constructing condominiums and apartments for middle and 
upper class people. The property market in Jakarta has a strange characteristic in that 
the more expensive and unique a property product, the more people want to buy it. This 
way, with the expensive price, the developers also earn larger profit. 
The licensing cost needed to build a flat or simple housing is 20 per cent of the price. 
Even more, according to Willy Prananto, Deputy Chairman on Law and Regulation of the 
Regional Board of Indonesian Real Estate (REI), the licensing cost to build flat is as 
much as the cost spent to request an apartment licence41. A similar statement is made by 
Lukman Purnomosidi: given the expensive licensing cost to build flats, it is more 
profitable for developers to build apartments.42 
With no incentive at all the developers prefer developing apartments or real estate. By 
developing real estate they get a bigger profit in a shorter term. There is a licensing cost, 
but as the amount is the same as that to build flat, luxury apartment development 
becomes the preference. The more expensive the product is offered, the less is the 
percentage of licence cost spent. 
Apart from obliging developers to build flats, the Jakarta Government also allocates a 
Provincial Budget for flat building. However, in 2005 the Jakarta Government could build 
only 3,360 units. The obstacle was primarily the lack of funds. The Jakarta Provincial 
Budget allocated only 2 per cent or IDR 150 million for the development of flats. In 
practice, the Jakarta Government so far can only realize the construction of 600-700 flats 
every year.   
Besides the availability of flats, another important issue to raise is for whom flats are 
built? At the beginning, flats were provided to those who lived in dirty settlements along 
the railway track and the urban poor in Jakarta. But in later development, because of 
their strategic location and the increasingly expensive monthly cost of gas, water, and 
maintenance, lots of flats changed hands. In many flats, branded cars occupy the parking 
lots, meaning that the flats are inhabited or owned by the middle class. By staying in flats 
located in the central city, middle class people can avoid being trapped in traffic jams 
every day. 
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There is actually a niche in the housing market that has not been addressed by 
developers, i.e. middle-class apartments with a price range of IDR 100 - 200 million, 
which is similar with the price of housing in the outskirts of Jakarta. These apartments 
would be affordable for those who now occupy flats intended for the urban poor in 
Jakarta.  
 
3.4 Analysis of Jakarta regional budget 
Is it true that the Jakarta Government does not have enough funds to build cheap 
housing or flats? To answer the question, let us look at the Jakarta Provincial Budget. 
In fact, the Province of DKI Jakarta is one of wealthy provinces in Indonesia. One of the 
indicators is the large Original Regional Revenue (PAD) that constitutes half of the total 
regional revenue. Table 13, indicating the composition of Jakarta revenue during 2000-
2005, shows the increase of PAD in the last few years. PAD is obtained from 
advertisement tax, property tax, parking and other income for activities or services. This 
suggests that, as the capital city, Jakarta relies on the service and trading sectors. 
With the large amount of PAD, Jakarta has the freedom to direct the city development. 
The small amount of balance transfer fund, i.e. assistance fund from the national 
government, leads Jakarta to having bigger independence economically in comparison to 
other regions to organize its territory. 
 
Table 13. Composition of Regional Revenue of Jakarta Province during 2000-
2005 (in IDR billion) 
Source of Revenue 
Region-based 
Revenue Balance Fund 
Other legal 
sources of 
revenue43 
Total 
Year 
Value % Value % Value % Value % 
2000 1,359.44 40.11 1,405.25 41.46 624.69 18.43 3,389.42 100 
2001 3,050.39 40.69 3,292.63 43.93 1,152.51 15.38 7,495.54 100 
2002 3,546.42 39.85 3,731.07 41.93 1,620.91 18.22 8,898.40 100 
2003 4,661.73 52.24 4,261.64 47.76 0 0 8,923.36 100 
2004 6,134.56 55.70 4,701.01 42.68 176.74 1.60 11,012.31 100 
2005 6,639.20 56.37 4,994.80 42.41 192.30 1.63 11,776.30 100 
Source: Regional Budgets 2000 - 2004 and Financial Note 2005 of Jakarta Province (FITRA, 2005).  
 
Then how does the Jakarta Government disburse their money? For what purposes is the 
Provincial Budget allocated? In general, Table 14 categorizes regional expenditures into 
two types: i.e. regional officials and public service. 
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Table 14. Composition of Regional Expenditure of Jakarta Province based on 
Types of Expenditures during 2000-2004 and Draft Regional Budget 
2005 (in IDR trillion) 
Type of Expenditure 
Regional Officials Public Service 
Year Value of 
Regional 
Expenditures 
Value % Value % 
2000 3.39 2.36 69.62 1.09 30.38 
2001 7.09 4.99 70.38 2.51 29.62 
2002 9.35 5.72 61.18 3.63 38.82 
2003 11.56 4.23 36.6 7.33 63.4 
2004 12.16 3.98 31.9 8.18 68.1 
2005  13.839  5.76 41.62 8.07 58.31 
Source: Jakarta Province Regional Budget Year 2000-2004, Draft Regional Budget 2005/Financial 
Note in 2005 (modified) 
 
In 2000, when the regional autonomy policy was launched by the national government, 
which devolves more authority to regional governments, more than half of the budget 
was used to finance regional officials. Going into detail, the regional official expenditures 
comprise salary of civil servants and operational costs of government offices. However, 
along with the increase of PAD, public expenditures also increase. Public expenditures 
are budget allocated for development of public facilities, e.g. infrastructure, cleaning and 
others. Started at 2003, the public expenditures have constituted more than half of the 
institutional cost of the government. Although this expenditures declined in 2005, it still 
had a larger portion than the expenditure for officials. 
How then are public expenditures used? For what sectors are they allocated? Table 15 
can give an illustration on allocation of public expenditures in the last three years. 
 
Table 15. Regional Expenditure of Jakarta Province based on Fields of 
Development during 2003-2004, Draft Regional Budget 2005 (in IDR 
billion) 
Year 
2003 2004 2005 No 
Field of 
Developmen
t 
Value % Value % Value % 
% 
Averag
e 
1. Law, 
security, 
public order 
and national 
unity 
485.74 4.20 778.83 6.16 641.13 4.63 4.99 
2. Government 3,724.44 32.21 3,062.11 24.24 3,507.78 25.34 27.25 
3. Economy 458.21 3.96 460.174 3.64 474.99 3.43 3.67 
4. Education 
and health  
2,878.38 24.89 3,784.45 29.96 3,562.82 25.74 26.85 
5. Population 
and 
employment 
168.05 1.45 167.44 1.32 186.59 1.34 1.37 
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6. Social and 
cultural 
affairs 
816.36 7.06 985.54 7.8 949.34 6.85 7.23 
7. Natural 
resources 
and 
environment  
657.40 5.69 658.90 5.21 848.02 6.12 5.67 
8. Urban facility 
and 
infrastructure  
2,374.34 20.53 2,733.58 21.64 3,668.55 26.50 22.89 
Total 11,562.93 100 12,631.05 100 13,839.24 100 100 
Source: Financial Note of 2003, 2004 and 2005 of Jakarta Province 
 
On average, the cost for employment and population, which in general means the cost 
for housing and provision of job opportunities, gets only 1.37 per cent of the total budget, 
while the cost allocation for public law and order and the unity of the nation, which can be 
generally interpreted as the cost to carry out eviction of squatter settlements and street 
peddlers was as much as 4.99 per cent. 
From the budget allocation, the cost for housing construction was smaller than the 
eviction cost. The cost of creating or encouraging the provision of job opportunities was 
less than the cost to organise evictions of street peddlers and squatter settlements and 
maintenance of order in the city’s other facilities. It is to be noted that the target of 
maintenance of order is always the poor. There is no such act against occupancy of 
public land by public interests. Instead of enforcing order or running eviction, the City 
Plan would be twisted to adjust with illegal occupancy that has taken place44. 
 
3.5 Illustration of licensing bureaucracy in Jakarta Province 
In 2005, the attempt to fulfil the demand for housing experienced a crisis of about 6.5 
million units. This figure results from the difference between the public demand for 
housing and the housing construction that was completed. The slow effort to meet the 
demand for housing was attributed to the reluctance of private developers to be involved 
in housing construction, especially the subsidized simple housing. 
Among other causes of the developers’ reluctance was the factor of high cost economy. 
What is meant by high cost economy is the existence of many different charges, both 
official and illegal, in the process of housing construction. Among other charges were the 
cost of certificate issuance, the licence to build property, and the cost of gaining rights 
over the land and property. 
Although initially all licensing responsibilities were borne by the developer, all the 
licensing cost will be charged to the consumers, so that the price of house becomes 
more expensive. As an illustration, the cost to gain rights on land and building of 
subsidized Healthy Simple Houses (RSS) is 5 per cent of the price of the house itself. 
This does not include other licences that must also be paid.  
In Jakarta Province, for instance, in order to be able to build a house or office building, 
mall or other property, the developer has to obtain a principle licence; among others are 
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SP3L (The Principle Agreement Letter of the Site/Land Purchase), SIPPT (The Licence 
of Land Appropriation) and IMB (The Licence of Building Construction) issued by the 
Government. 
The problem later is not only related to the high costs, but also the fact that licensing 
bureaucracy is long-winded and very lengthy. Even to get only one licence, sometimes 
three years are needed. Therefore, some developers take the short cut of doing 
marketing before the licence is obtained, an approach that may cause problems in the 
future. 
As explained in the general clarification produced by the Jakarta Provincial Government, 
SP3L is a letter issued by the Governor of DKI Jakarta concerning an agreement of the 
purchase of a tract of land located on a main lane and/or if the size is the same as or 
larger than 5000 m2, the exploitation of which must be adjusted to the city plan. The unit 
serving SP3L is the Advisory Body of Land Affairs (BPUT) where the Governor of Jakarta 
acts as Chairman and the Head of City Plan Office as Secretary. 
The benefits and uses of SP3L are as follows: 
1. Licence to purchase site/land in Jakarta from the Governor of Jakarta in accordance 
with the Letter of Decision of the Governor of DKI Jakarta Number 540 of 1990. 
2. The letter constitutes one of the requirements in order to request for SIPPT in Jakarta 
for physical construction and right certification over the land. 
3. Sanction can be imposed if purchase of site/land in Jakarta is done without SP3L in 
accordance with the Letter of Decision of the Governor of Jakarta Number 640 of 
199245. 
As admitted by Willy Prananto, The Deputy Chairman on Law and Regulation of the 
Jakarta Regional Board of Indonesian Real Estate to Sinar Harapan Daily (2003), it takes 
at least 10 months to obtain an SP3L, with a condition that the related officials are 
available. In reality, the licence can only be obtained after waiting for three years. That is 
also the case with the licence of SIPPT which, based on the experience of Regional 
Board of REI of DKI of Jakarta, takes at least 1 year. 
Willy also regrets that the licensing for flat construction is treated as the same as that for 
apartment construction. This surely brings in the consequence that flats cannot be 
offered at an affordable price as the licensing cost is very expensive.  
The complaint is shared by Lukman Purnomosidi, the General Chairman of National 
Board of Real Estate Indonesia. According to him, the price rise of RSS (Healthy Simple 
Houses) of 16 per cent, from IDR 36 million to 42 million for 36/90 type is unavoidable as 
an impact of the rise in fuel prices. However, REI hopes that the government can address 
the issue of high cost economy that is related to the licensing process, certification, and 
infrastructure development46. 
According to Lukman Purnomosidi, the high cost economy in the simple housing sector 
involves three things: i.e. licensing, certification and supply of infrastructure such as 
electricity. As for electricity, developers have to pay construction costs and grant 
financing. What is meant by grant financing is that for the provision of electricity poles, 
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wires, and so on. The grant for one house may reach IDR 1 million, whereas the price of 
an RSS house is IDR 47 million. This does not include the IMB (building construction 
licence) issuance cost of IDR 1 million, certification cost of 1 million, and others, so that 
when the costs for licensing, certification and infrastructure development are summed up 
they can constitute IDR 4 to 6 million. In total, the licensing, certification and 
infrastructure construction costs may end up as much as 10 per cent of the end price of 
an RSS. 
According to Iskandar Saleh, The Deputy Minister of Housing for Financing Affairs, the 
high licensing and other costs related to house construction, which sometimes are as 
large as those needed to construct a luxurious house, as well as difficulty in obtaining a 
licence in a short time, can be seen as the unwillingness of the Government to take 
sides, especially of the Regional Government to the poor. 
Why the Regional Government? This is because the licensing practices, ranging from 
IMB, land certification, certification of Property Right of Usage to issuance for individuals, 
are in the hands of Regional Government. Therefore, in order to deal with the barriers of 
licensing bureaucracy in the housing development for the poor, Iskandar Saleh proposes 
that licensing simplification of bureaucracy and removal of tariffs on licensing so that they 
do not burden consumers from the low class community. 
Apart from the one-size-fit-all policy on licensing cost that leads to the expensive price of 
a simple house, the absence of certainty in the period needed to obtain a licence is a 
separate problem. On the one hand there are many applicants who obtain a licence in 
short period of time but on the other hand many developers represented by Real Estate 
Indonesia (REI) complain about the years taken to obtain a licence. 
The fact there is no certainty with regard to period of time needed indicates that there is 
mal-administration, a practice of bad administration in the public institutions by officials or 
employees, which in the view of British Local Government means: (1) taking too much 
time in doing something that is one’s responsibility; (2) not following existing rules or law; 
(3) breaking promises; (4) treating members of community unfairly; (5) providing false 
information; (6) not making decision in the right way47.  
In general, a measure or decision that can be classified as a part of mal-administration is 
as follows48: 
• Involving oddity; 
• Breaking the norms; 
• Unfair; 
• Violating the rules; 
• Abusing power; 
• Against propriety; 
• Causing unnecessary delay. 
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4. Best practice Good Governance: an experience of Solok 
District 
Solok District has become well-known in Indonesia, especially on the issue of good 
governance, starting when the Head of Solok District, Gamawan Fauzi, initiated a 
progressive idea to eradicate corruption, mainly in the scope of administration 
bureaucracy. It cannot be denied that there are many factors contributing to successful 
eradication of corruption. One of them was the existence of political will from the 
leadership in pioneering the start of a change. In Solok District, Gamawan Fauzi was a 
figure that became distinctive compared to former heads of region as he created the 
foundation of a good governance system for the administration he managed.   
The evidence was shown when in 2004 Gamawan Fauzi received Bung Hatta 
Anticorruption Award (BHACA) that was granted by BHACA Association, which ICW 
participated to establish. The BHACA Association itself, since it was founded in 2003, 
had started the selection and interview of individual candidates who had various 
backgrounds, including the administration, private sector and civil society, as an effort to 
confirm seriously who really deserved the award.     
The vision of BHACA Association itself is no other than to encourage and promote 
individuals who have shown effort, strong will, perseverance, and real action to eliminate 
corruption in their own milieu. Pioneering becomes a strategic issue highlighted by 
BHACA Association considering that corrupt practices are rampant, and some 
communities have even considered it as entrenched divergence.49   
In the situation where corruption has become a systemic deviating behaviour, the 
corruptors have frequently obtained inappropriate appreciation, as the society may define 
success from a material perspective, namely in terms of position held and one’s wealth. 
Moreover, the corruptors often are regular donors in their social environment, a fact that 
turns them into generous Santa Claus offering help for the needy, whereas, the money 
used for the donation is obtained from corrupt practices.   
On the other hand, people who refuse to go along with corruption are considered weird, 
odd, and often isolated from social relationships. One’s rejection of corruption is 
considered even more unreasonable when the individual is in a position that allows and 
provides big opportunities for him/her to be corrupt, yet one resists the desire. It is people 
like this who become little candles in the darkness of widespread corrupt practices in 
Indonesia. With the presence of the BHACA reward, it is expected that there will be more 
and candles in terms of number and power so they can increasingly provide more good 
examples on the way to clean governance. 
In addition to obtaining the BHACA Award in commemorating Anticorruption Day on 
December 9, 2005, Gamawan Fauzi and Jacob Oetama, the owner of the Kompas Daily, 
were awarded the Tiga Pilar Award by Tiga Pilar Kemitraan (Three Pillar Partnership). 
Gamawan Fauzi was appraised as having applied a pact of honesty in running the 
administration wheel and the agreement not to do corruption that was written in the 
integrity pact. The recipients of Tiga Pilar Award passed a selection based on a number 
of criteria: that they had never been sentenced for corruption, they had never made news 
with regards to being implicated in a corruption case, having applied free corruption 
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management and having taken deep and brave innovative steps to eliminate corruption 
in their working environment. 
Other evidence of his efforts to eliminate corruption in Solok District, which had been 
started since 1997, was when Gamawan Fauzi won by majority votes the direct governor 
of West Sumatera province in 2005 just in one circle. The pair of Gamawan Fauzi/Marlis 
Rahman got 756,657 votes (41.54 per cent) out of 1,821,446 valid votes. The number of 
voters who did not use their voting right was 1.045 million or increased by 40,000 
compared to those not turning out to vote in the presidential election in 200450.   
The trust given by the people of West Sumatera made his way to Governor position 
easier. In 2005, Gamawan Fauzi was officially inaugurated as the Governor of West 
Sumatera for the period of 2005-2010. His serious efforts to create an administration 
system that was free from corruption, collusion, and nepotism during his terms as the 
Head of Solok District was politically very powerful in establishing his positive image. 
Without having to practics money politics during the political process, the steps of 
Gamawan Fauzi to seize the Sumatera Barat Governor position were unstoppable.51  
Chronologically, the breakthrough made by Gamawan Fauzi in starting the change in 
Solok District can be elaborated into several phases of idea introduction, as follows: 
Firstly, the establishment of administration system of Solok District in implementing Good 
Governance and Clean Governance by reforming the public service practice that is free 
from corruption, collusion and nepotism. In 1997 Pos Pelayanan Umum Satu Pintu Plus 
Kantor Bupati Solok was established, the one-door plus public service station of Head of 
Solok District Office, which served 30 kinds of licensing, an early breakthrough. 
In his opinion, the global challenge in the present era required the existence of 
competitiveness in business activity and a competitive and high-quality service system. 
One of the barriers in the creation of competitiveness was the long twisted red tape 
practice in various public services provided by government apparatus. The uncertainty 
over requirements resulted from rules that kept changing and were burdensome. Among 
the complaints of the community this was taken as a serious problem. Uncertainty was 
also associated with the length of time needed to get a service, the lack of transparency 
in the cost components that had to be paid by the service seekers, and the existence of 
service system and procedure that were not transparent and did not have a standard. 
Therefore, an effective and efficient, quick and punctual service system and mechanism 
was needed, to: 
• Create a simplification in the procedure of first-class public for the community; 
• Provide ease and satisfaction for the community in getting services; 
• Give clarity and certainty with regard to procedures, requirements, cost and time 
needed in obtaining service; 
• Create a comfortable and pleasing environment for the community while requesting 
the service; 
• Provide information on public services for the community; 
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• Provide open information concerning rights and obligations as well as the 
requirements, both for the service provider and recipient; 
• Avoid the possibility of abuse the authority and charges that were not in line with the 
existing stipulations; 
• Create a clean authority that is free from corruption, collusion and nepotism; 
• Improve the region’s competitiveness in many respects, mainly in attracting 
investments; 
• Establish a system that could be accessed and controlled by the community.    
Based on the Presidential Directive Number 5 of 1994 concerning Guidelines for 
Simplification and Control of Licensing; Letter of Decision of Minister for The Efficient Use 
of State Apparatus Number 81 of 1993 on Guidelines for the Management of Public 
Service; Presidential Directive Number 1 of 1995 on the Improvement and Promotion of 
Public Service Quality by Government Apparatus for the Community; Circular Letter of 
West Sumatra Governor Number 14/ED/GSB/1995 on Guidelines for the Management of 
Public Service, the Head of Solok District published a series of regulations that stipulated 
the one-door plus service station, i.e.:           
1. Letter of Decision of Head of Solok District Number 112/BUP-1996 on Mechanism for 
the Implementation of Public Service in Solok District Administration. 
2. Letter of Decision of Head of Solok District Number 254/BUP-1997 on the 
Establishment of One Door Public Service Station in Solok District Administration. 
3. Letter of Decision of Head of Solok District Number 09 of 1998 on the Establishment 
of One-Door Plus Public Service Station and Decision on Types of Licences and 
Public Services served through One-Door Plus Public Service Station. 
4. Letter of Decision of Head of Solok District Number 591/BUP-2001 on the Guidelines 
of Licensing and Public Services in Solok District. 
As the policy of One-Door Plus Public Service Station reached the level of subdistrict and 
villages, it was necessary to have an adequate infrastructure to improve the service 
effectiveness. Therefore, on October 1, 2000, a Cooperation Agreement Number 
181/10/Huk-2000 about Service to the Community was made between Solok District 
Government and Pos Indonesia Ltd, Solok Post Office. 
It was considered that Solok District was a relatively big region in West Sumatera, 
stretching from north to south along ±150 km. The distance between subdistrict capital 
and District capital is around 5 km at the shortest and 65 km at the farthest, meaning that 
the community who wanted to obtain the service of this One-Door Public Service Station 
in the Head of Solok District Office might take a long time and spend a lot on transport. 
By working together with Pos Indonesia Ltd, Solok community living remotely in the 
villages does not need to come to Head of Solok District Office to get the service. 
Instead, they only need to come to Kantor Pos dan Giro (Post Office) at sub-district level. 
The procedure and mechanism provided by Pos Indonesia Ltd was similar to what was 
given by One-Door Plus Public Service Station, although the process might take a little 
bit longer, but it will not exceed the determined time limit. In addition, it is not necessary 
for the community to spend high transportation cost as they simply need to buy postal 
stamps to obtain services.  
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Figure 5. Direct Service Flowchart 
 
  
Figure 6. Service Flowchart Via PT Pos Indonesia 
 
Some of the thirty types of service provided through the One-Door Plus Public Service 
Station are shown in Table 16. 
 
Table 16. The kinds of service available through One-Door Public Service Station  
No. Type No. Type 
1. Building construction licence (IMB) 16. Establishment of drug store 
2. Disturbances licence 17. Licence for doctor practice 
3. Business site licence 18. Licence for midwife practice 
4. Land use appropriation licence  19. Licence for establishment of private training 
institute 
5. Advertisement licence 20. Publication of cooperative legal entity 
6. Research licence 21. Registration of the trading business 
7. Licence for motor transportation 
business 
22. Registration of company 
8. The licence for new/extended route of 
public transportation 
23. Licence of trading business 
9. Control card of the trade licence 24. Licence of industrial business 
10. Incidental licence 25. Registration of warehouse 
11. Control card for designated route of 
public transportation 
26-
30 
Others 
12. The rental of district property/wealth   
13. Birth certificate (the population 
statistics) 
  
14. Licence for donation collection   
15. Establishment of pharmacy    
 
PT Pos Request 
One-Door 
Plus 
Service 
Station
Unit In 
Charge 
Request One-Door Plus 
Service Station 
Unit in Charge 
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To emphasize the aspect of transparency and certainty of requirements, time length and 
cost for service, Solok District government has published a brochure that explains all 
items concerning aspects of service. The brochure has been widely distributed 
throughout the community free of charge. The provision of knowledge on different things 
necessary for the public to know, especially in the District of Solok, was intended to make 
sure that the community feel easiness, convenience, satisfaction and certainty in 
requesting licences and the public service needed.  
As an illustration, Table 17 shows a scheme to describe in detail the information in the 
brochure of One-Door Plus Public Service Station of the Head of Solok District Office. 
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Table 17. Information contained in the Public Service Station brochure 
Type of 
licence 
Requirements Cost Length of 
process 
Period of 
validity 
Building 
Construction 
Licence 
• Letter of request 
• Technical drawing 
• Letter clarifying land 
status 
• Letter of statement of 
development 
• Temporary IDE 50 
thousand. 
• Semi-permanent IDR 
150 thousand. 
• Permanent IDR 200 
thousand. 
• Steel frame IDR 250 
thousand. 
9 days As long as the 
building exists 
Disturbance 
licence 
• Letter of request 
• Letter clarifying land 
and border 
• Letter stating fulfilment 
of K3 
• Site map  
• Photocopy of ID 
• Photograph of 3x4 
size 
• Recommendation 
from related technical 
institution 
Administration IDR 150 
thousand. 
Licence issuance IDR 
250 thousand. 
Note:  
Cost is classified into 
three categories and the 
annual renewal cost 
based on the 
classification is added. 
 
5 days 5 years 
Licence of 
Land Use 
Appropriation 
• Letter of request. 
• Act of establishment 
of the legal entity 
• Evidence of 
registration of legal 
entity 
• Site licence 
• Tax identification 
number  
• Photocopy of ID 
Proposal 
• Agreement of 
investment  
• Recommendation 
from government 
office related to the 
appropriation 
For housing 
business/BTN parcel 
land and the like: 
• Administration: IDR 
25 thousand. 
Licence issuance 
process: 
• RSS Site IDR 25/m2 
• RS Site IDR 50/m2 
• Real estate and 
others IDR 100/m2 
 
12 days - 
Licence of 
Warehouse 
Listing 
Photocopy of HO 
Copy of ID card 
Copy of Notary Act  
Photograph 3x4. 
IDR 500/m2 5 days - 
Others     
Source: One-Door Plus Service Station brochure 
 
To ensure the certainty of a systematic administration, order and service provision in the 
process of public service, One-Door Plus Public Service Station issues three copies of 
service note. The official keeps the first copy; the second copy is kept by the requester 
and the third is for archive. Figure 7 is the service note in detail.  
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The One-Door Service Station 
Solok District Government 
 
Registration No.             :  ……………………………………….…………………… 
Name of consumer     : ……………………………………….…………………… 
Address   : ……………………………………….…………………… 
Type of Service       : ……………………………………….…………………… 
Date application received : ……………………………………….…………………… 
Date field supervised : ……………………………………….…………………… 
Date of completion : ……………………………………….…………………… 
Management Unit       : ……………………………………….…………………… 
Cost                      :  IDR ……………………………………….. 
 
Aro Suka, ……………………………………….. 
The official, 
 
 
(………………………………..) 
 
Figure 7. Service note 
 
As a form of control mechanism over the public service quality, One-Door Plus Public 
Service Station periodically distributes questionnaire to service seekers for evaluation 
purposes. In principle, there are five lists of questions covering these following aspects: 
1. The official’s attitude in providing service  
2. The procedure 
3. The charged tariff 
4. The length of time to get a licence 
5. Licence requirements 
 
To maintain privacy and deal with possibility of unfair treatments for service seekers who 
give negative responses, the questionnaires are filled out anonymously. The information 
necessary to be provided is the type of licence being requested by the service seeker. 
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This way, those who provide inputs and criticism or even protests can freely express their 
complaints objectively, without fearing retaliation from the service provider. 
 
Each semester, the questionnaires collected are analysed quantitatively by the service 
officer and become a reference for the improvement of policy regarding the public service 
system. As an example, Table 18 shows the results of an evaluation collected in the six-
month period of January until July 2004. 
 
Table 18. Results of service questionnaires 
No. of answers N
o. 
Month No. of 
questionnaires 
Positive Negative 
 
1. January 34 156 5 91.76 % 
2. February 32 153 4 95.63 % 
3. March 21 98 1 93.33 % 
4. April 27 123 2 91.11 % 
5. May 25 116 1 92.80 % 
6. June 42 198 2 94.29 % 
 
Secondly, the District enacted a regional regulation concerning Transparency in 
Governance and Public Participation as materialized in Regional Regulation Number 5 of 
2004. Although at national level the legislation regarding freedom of information had not 
been passed, the positive precedence promoted by the city/district or provincial 
governments issuing regional regulation on transparency of governance can be a general 
reference and important new principles to adopt. 
In Solok District itself, there are several things providing a foundation for the issuance of 
the Regional Regulation on Transparency in Governance, i.e.: 
Firstly, the formulation, implementation and evaluation of various public policies by the 
Local Government and Provincial Legistlature that had been considered not very 
transparent. 
Secondly, it is hard for the public to access and find out about the products of public 
policy such as getting documents and information. This kind of circumstances makes 
government practice untransparent and very bureaucratic as there is no clear mechanism 
regulating the right and obligation of the community in getting service and information. 
Thirdly, as consequences of the first and second problems, the community engagement 
in many kinds of activities in formulation, implementation, and evaluation of public policy 
becomes very low. This is triggered by the lack of transparency from the government, 
unclear mechanism for the engagement of the community in public policy making, and 
the lack of access to public information by the community.  
Fourthly, along this time, the public right to get information is only considered as 
formality. It means that after many kinds of policy products are put in the state or region 
gazette, the community is automatically assumed to have known them as the 
development of the policy involved an open meeting for the public.  
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So as to not having the Regional Regulation on Governance and Public Participation left 
as empty papers but instead referred to in the activities of government, the development 
of this Regulation on Transparency in Solok District accommodate many things to ensure 
that the system stipulated well the implementation of transparent governance and the 
engagement of the community in the formulation and oversight of regional policies. There 
are nine main subjects regulated in Regional Regulation Number 5 of 2004, i.e.: 
1. The existence of community’s right and obligation to seek and obtain services and 
information. 
2. Types of information the community has to know. 
3. The clear procedure of public participation. 
4. The procedures in the local government’s environment and legislatures are among 
information the community has to know and which has to be informed to them. 
5. The process and mechanism of policymaking in the local government and legislature. 
6. The submission of objection and complaint.  
7. The settlement of dispute. 
8. There are sanctions for the lawbreaker. 
9. There is protection for whistle-blower. 
Although this Regional Regulation is not unique for Solok District, the serious attempts to 
make new values, the rule for the implementation of governance can be seen from the 
articles covering aspects explained above52.  
Another policy introduced by Gamawan Fauzi was the initiation of the Integrity Pact in 
early 2004, which targeted all officials in Solok District Government. In principle, the 
Integrity Pact was made to increase the dignity and image of government officials in 
Solok District. The Integrity Pact constitutes a pledge not to accept and give any illegal 
forms of gifts during provision of services covering procurement of goods and services, 
public services, public policy making and implementation of regional budget. The Integrity 
Pact was implemented in the Head of Solok District’s Regulation Number 48 of 2004 on 
the Guidelines of the Implementation of the Integrity Pact of Solok District. 
This Integrity Pact covers a few prohibited acts, i.e.: 
• Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism. 
• Requesting or accepting a gift, both directly or indirectly in the form of bribe, present, 
donation or other forms. 
• Giving or promising to give bribe, present, donation that is connected with the 
position or occupation. 
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 As a comparison, the West Kalimantan Province has also enacted Regional Regulation on 
Transparency. However, various community organization such as the Alliance of Independent 
Journalists (AJI) of West Kalimantan, Kontak Borneo and Gamawan complained about the lack of 
sanction mechanism for officials who declined to provide information or public documents to the 
community requesting them. 
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• Not following the process related to payment, stamped date and format as written in 
the standard format.  
• Breaking the transparency commitment in implementing the activities. 
• Covering up or complicating access to information when requested by individuals, 
institution, or organization.  
• Not providing service or complicating the provision of information. 
• Not providing help, support for the disclosure of corruption, collusion, and nepotism 
practices. 
• Not enforcing sanctions to the violators of the government officials’ disciplinary codes 
and the Integrity Pact. 
In order to maintain the commitment and several of anti-corruption policy in Solok District 
governance, Head of Solok District Regent formulates a policy that is connected to the 
improvement of welfare of government officials and functionaries. The mechanism 
established for this purpose is by shifting the honorarium for projects, committee works 
and the like, which had been a common practice in the regional budget. This type of 
expenditure was shifted into the so-called regional allowance that is provided annually in 
proportion with workload and responsibility of each employee. A functionary or officer 
caught imposing charges or engaging in corrupt practice will receive a heavy sanction, 
i.e. termination of employment.  
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5. Conclusion 
Among other strategies that can be taken to enhance the government’s capacity in the 
provision of housing is by combating corruption. In the field of licensing, for example, the 
government’s success in cutting ‘the invisible costs’ and various charges would be 
significant in reducing prices of homes for the poor. A World Bank survey illustrates how 
the rampant practice of corruption in Indonesia makes the country unattractive for foreign 
investment. Various researches also indicate how corruption creates negative impacts on 
the provision of facilities and access to the poor. 
As businesspeople are driven by economic profit, the government needs to provide 
incentives to encourage them to develop simple housing. Although the profit margin 
offered is low, larger scale development will lead to simple housing construction project 
providing an attractive profit for developers. Therefore cutting the bureaucracy procedure 
and eradicating corruption will bring significant incentives for developers working in the 
provision of simple housing. 
In eradicating corruption in licensing and bureaucratic reform, the government of DKI 
Jakarta can learn from the success of the Solok District. The strategy and policy 
implemented in combating corruption carried out by Regent Gamawan Fauzi are 
replicable. It has become a trend in several district/city governments to provide one-door 
services in licensing. It would not then be difficult for the Jakarta administration to 
eradicate corruption through simplification of bureaucracy. What is needed is political will. 
As the Jakarta Governor dares to conduct forcible eviction in poor community settlements 
despite the protests, the Governor should dare to carry out bureaucratic reform and 
corruption eradication. Moreover, there would be much support if the Governor takes the 
measures. 
With regard to budget, the concern of the Jakarta Government that leads to the increase 
of budget allocation for the provision of housing is much awaited. However, what is 
needed is a shift of paradigm in the budgeting process. So far there is a large amount of 
funds allocated for maintenance and enforcement of order. From here it is suggested that 
the existing problems in Jakarta are caused by people who are not orderly so that large 
fund needs to be made available. Take the squatter settlement as an example, which 
emerges and grows as the government fails to provide decent housing for the people; in 
this case it is the problem within the city administration that needs to be addressed.  
Still related to budget, the Jakarta city administration is currently planning a number of 
mass transportation means, such as monorail and subway. The investment in such mass 
transportation infrastructure is not cheap at all, but necessitated by the problem of traffic 
congestion in Jakarta. The congestion, however, not only results from the number of 
private vehicles whose growth is uncontrolled or the minimum means of public 
transportation. In fact, the congestion is primarily attributed to those who work in Jakarta 
but live in the outskirts of the metropolitan area. Therefore, if the congestion problem is 
addressed by developing public transportation means like monorail and subway, this will 
not overcome the whole congestion problem. Many people are forced to live in the 
suburbs as the homes are affordable. Given that, the development of public 
transportation needs to be carried out side by side with the provision of affordable 
housing in the city. Following this line of thought, when the Jakarta government allocates 
large fund to develop monorail and subway, why does it not allocate the similar amount 
for the provision of cheap housing in the city centre? 
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In the provision of housing, corruption eradication can be carried out by reforming Perum 
Perumnas into a sound company. As a state-owned developer, Perumnas has scored 
some achievements in the provision of healthy and simple housings. However, due to 
various corrupt practices, Perumnas suffers from financial loss. Because of corrupt 
practices, too, Perumnas loses orientation, leaves the business of developing for the 
poor and entering the business of developing luxurious homes. 
By promoting the reform of Perumnas, it will not be necessary for the government to 
provide additional subsidy for the poor. Therefore, the corruption eradication and 
implementation of good corporate governance must be done. The loss of Perumnas 
eventually affects not only the government but also the poor whose opportunity narrowed 
down for obtaining cheap housing from Perumnas. 
Another measure the government can take is providing a finance facility, primarily finance 
for healthy, simple housing where the majority of buyers are not bankable and do not 
meet the administrative requirements in getting the bank credits, among others are fixed 
income and employment as well as availability of collateral. That way, the establishment 
of the Secondary Mortgage Facility institution that works in a market system is not 
sufficient. The government has to create a finance institution that will reach the poor. 
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APPENDIX  
Description of Cases 
 
Corruption Allegation in Region III of Perumnas, Cengkareng 
In 2000, to ease the burden of tax payment, the board of directors of Region III of Perum 
Perumnas issued a request letter to the local land and building tax office demanding to 
lower the Selling Value of Tax Object (NJOP). The request letter was accompanied by 
the issuance of letter number Reg. III/1250/07/2000 addressed to the Corporate Director 
of Perum Perumnas, requesting operational funds for an attempt to decrease the NJOP 
by as much as IDR 60 million paid to the survey team of the local tax office. The letter 
was a follow-up of a request by the Unit Manager of Kasiba Cengkareng in accordance 
with the letter number Reg. III/UPKC/261/2000. The request to lower NJOP was then 
granted by the local tax office; with the initial value NJOP of IDR 614 thousand/m² 
reduced to IDR 335 thousand/m² as indicated by SPPT PBB issued by Tax Office of 
West Jakarta. 
In 2001, based on the Equity Calculation Evaluation of KSPP Bumi Cengkareng Indah by 
Ancol Pusaka Ltd, which was about to establish a house –and store buildings on the land 
of Perum Perumnas in Cengkareng, land trading of 49,566 m² with the value of IDR 741 
thousand/m² net without filling in was agreed between President Director of Ancol 
Pusaka Ltd with President Director of Perum Perumnas. As a sign of commitment over 
the purchase of the land, Ancol Pusaka Ltd made the down payment of IDR 3 billion.  
On May 31, 2001, the President Director of Perum Perumnas issued a letter of 
assignment number Dirut/295/10/V/2001 addressed to the Director of Administration and 
Finance of Perum Perumnas to handle the daily business of the President Director 
without authority to take strategic decisions and policies. This was taken considering that 
the President Director of Perum Perumnas was going to attend Special Session on 
Habitat II Implementation Agenda in New York, USA.  
In between the memorandum of understanding between President Director of Perum 
Perumnas with Ancol Pusaka Ltd, on June 7, 2001, Director of Administration and 
Finance of Perum Perumnas on behalf of the President Director of Perum Perumnas 
issued a letter of proxy number Dirut/321/10/Vi/2001 to the General Manajer of Region III 
to carry out the hand-over of the use of land to Bangun Cipta Karya Perkasa Ltd located 
in Bloc A3, D1, D2 in the location of Perumnas Bumi Cengkareng Indah of 258,766 m². In 
other words, 258,766 m² of land owned by Perumnas Bumi Cengkareng Indah was sold 
to PT Bangun Cipta Karya Perkasa Ltd. The prices are indicated in Table 19. 
 
Table 19. Land prices in Perumnas Bumi Cengkareng Indah, 2001 
Location Area (m²) Price/m² 
Bloc A3 BCI 46,713.50  IDR 500 thousand 
Bloc D1 BCI 96,373.50  IDR 350 thousand 
Bloc D3 BCI 115,679  IDR 360 thousand 
Note: VAT is not included in the price 
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On August 1, 2001, an act binding the land trading was agreed as explained above 
between the GM of Region III with Bangun Cipta Karya Perkasa Ltd with the value of 
IDR 106,421,968,800 including VAT through the Notary of RA, SH in Ciputat. The 
agreement of land purchase created suspicion and did not make economic sense 
considering that Ancol Pusaka Ltd had offered a much higher price. The transaction 
binding was also very odd as it did not engage the President Director of Perum 
Perumnas and was done when there was still a binding trade with Ancol Pusaka Ltd. 
As the land bought on those three blocs was very cheap, on September 6, 2001, Bangun 
Cipta Karya Perkasa Ltd intended to buy more land owned by Perum Perumnas 
Cengkareng in Bloc A3 of 41,912.42 m² with the price of IDR 550 thousand/m² and Bloc 
A6 of 44,765.53 m² with the price of IDR 550 thousand/m².  
However, on October 11, 2001, the President Director of Perum Perumnas cancelled the 
act of transaction with Bangun Cipta Karya Perkasa Ltd as written in the Act of Trade 
Binding Number 1 with Notary RA. The cancellation was then renewed with Cooperation 
Agreement Number 4 between President Director of Perum Perumnas with Bangun Cipta 
Karya Perkasa Ltd to provide land, development, and management of housing and 
commercial buildings in the location of Bumi Cengkareng Indah of 270,166 m².53 
On September 20, 2002, based on the approval of the General Manager of Region III, 
Official Report of Cancellation of KSPP Agreement with Ancol Pusaka Ltd was signed. 
As the follow-up of the cancellation, at the discussion of a fine for the cancellation, Perum 
Perumnas agreed to return the down payment with an interest rate of 13.75 per cent per 
year.54  
Five days after the approval of the Act of Cooperation Agreement Number 4, the Act of 
Cooperation Agreement Number 03 between the President Director of Perum Perumnas 
and Bangun Cipta Karya Perkasa Ltd, to continue the cooperation over provision of land, 
construction, marketing and building management was issued. This was a follow-up to 
letter Number 045BCKP/IX/01 regarding land purchase plan in the location of Bumi 
Cengkareng Indah area by BCKP Ltd of about 86,177 m² located in Bloc A3 and Bloc A6. 
The area of land where there is cooperation between President Director of Perum 
Perumnas with Bangun Cipta Karya Perkasa Ltd was as shown in Table 20. 
 
Table 20. Total area of land in cooperation with BCKP Ltd 
Location Area of land (m²) Cost/m² 
Bloc A3 BCI 46,713.50  IDR 500 thousand 
Bloc D1 BCI 96,373.50  IDR 350 thousand 
Bloc D3 BCI    115,679  IDR 360 thousand 
Bloc A3 BCI 41,402.42  IDR 575 thousand 
Bloc A6 BCI 44,755.53  IDR 575 thousand 
Area of land 344,923.95   
Modified from Act of Cooperation Agreement and letter of Offer of BCKP Ltd 
 
                                                   
53
 See Cooperation Agreement Number 04 
54
 Minutes of Meeting, September 23, 2002 
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On June 10, 2002, a Cooperation Agreement was made to conduct cooperation in 
development and marketing of a Ready-to-use Land Parcel (KTM) in the location of Bumi 
Cengkareng Indah (BCI) area between the new President Director of Perum Perumnas 
and the President Director of Bangun Cipta Karya Perkasa Ltd. In substance, this 
agreement constitutes an affirmation as well as revision of the previous agreement made 
by the old President Director of Perumnas. 
On August 5, 2002, Letter of Licence of Land Appropriation (SIPPT) number 1557/-
1.711.5 was issued by the Governor of Jakarta, Sutiyoso, on the use of land of about 
375,051 m² located in East Cengkareng, Cengkareng Subdistrict, to build housing and 
facilities as requested by Perum Perumnas. The issuance of this SIPPT is an important 
part of the realization of cooperation between Perum Perumnas with Bangun Cipta Karya 
Perkasa Ltd. 
In that cooperation, each party places equity. Perum Perumnas provided land of 
375,051 m² with the value of IDR 97,513,260,000 as indicated in the equity calculation 
recapitulation document dated June 10, 2002 signed by President Director of Perum 
Perumnas, Operational Director II of Perumnas, Finance Director of Perumnas, and 
Director of Bangun Cipta Karya Perkasa Ltd. Similarly, Bangun Cipta Karya Perkasa Ltd 
provided a budget of IDR 43,248,145,150.55 In percentage, equity of Perum Perumnas is 
70.28 per cent while that of Bangun Cipta Karya Perkasa Ltd is 29.72 per cent.  
From the provided land of 357,051 m², 1,817 land parcels (KTM) would be developed at 
the price of IDR 228,056,210,000. This amount will be divided up based on the share of 
the cooperating parties. Referring to the Cooperation Agreement document between 
Perum Perumnas with Bangun Cipta Karya Perkasa Ltd, the first party in this case Perum 
Perumnas gained total revenue from sale as much as IDR 160,267,792,000 in 
accordance with the percentage of equity placement of 70.28 per cent. On the other 
hand, the second party (Bangun Cipta Karya Perkasa Ltd) earned revenue of 
IDR 67,788,418,000.  
Under the management of the new President Director of Perum Perumnas, Perum 
Perumnas again made a deal on construction, marketing and housing management, 
which is often termed as Cooperation of Construction and Marketing (Kerja Sama 
Pembangunan dan Pemasaran, KSPP) with Karya Megah Permai Ltd. On November 10, 
2003, through the Act of Notary Martin Roestamy, SH number 603, an Act of Cooperation 
Agreement was made between Perum Perumnas, through its proxy the General Manager 
of Region III of Perumnas, and the President Director of Karya Megah Permai Ltd. 
Similar to its previous cooperation agreements, Perum Perumnas provided land in the 
area of Bumi Cengkareng Indah (BCI) of 274,682 m² along with business finance, 
interest and marketing with equity value of IDR 109,598,118,000 (74.904 per cent); land 
and building tax (PBB) is included in this value. Meanwhile, Karya Megah Permai Ltd 
provided an amount of capital of IDR 36,719,702,314 (25.096 per cent).  
In the equity share, Perum Perumnas would earn revenue of IDR 151,091,383,115, while 
Karya Megah Permai Ltd received IDR 47,964,116,885. The amount of revenue was 
appropriated based on the equity submitted in the KSPP cooperation. As mentioned in 
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 Official report of Evaluation and Negotiation of the Plan of Cooperation in Construction and Marketing 
of Ready-to-Use Land Parcels (KTM) in the location of Bumi Cengkareng Indah area (later changed 
into Bumi Citra Idaman), Cengkareng, West Jakarta, June 10, 2002 
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the document of payment schedule of KSPP cooperation, Perum Perumnas will receive 
early payment of IDR 30,000,000,000. The remainder would be paid in 17 instalments, 
starting from January 12, 2004 through to May 31, 2005. 
Although the business activity of Perum Perumnas of Cengkareng with Bangun Cipta 
Karya Perkasa Ltd as well as Karya Megah Permai Ltd was defined as Construction and 
Marketing Cooperation (KSPP), in practice this business of Perum Perumnas was 
nothing more than land selling. This is the case as the equity submitted by Perum 
Perumnas to the second party, i.e. Bangun Cipta Karya Perkasa Ltd and Karya Megah 
Permai Ltd is land. The other matter in the cooperation contract was that it was 
mentioned that the right of Perum Perumnas in the form of revenue from the cooperation 
would be paid in advance. Upon the completion of the payment, Perum Perumnas has no 
more right on anything, be it the land, revenue on housing management or others.  
 
Allegation of state loss caused by KSPP  
When we see the cooperation contract of KSPP Number 3 as well as Number 4 between 
Perum Perumnas and Bangun Cipta Karya Perkasa Ltd made between October 16, 2001 
and June 10, 2002, it seems Perum has gained large amount of revenue.  
 
Table 21. Revenue of Perum Perumnas on KSPP Cooperation Agreements  
No. Amount of Equity of 
Perumnas 
Year of Contract Equity Value 
 (IDR) 
1. 375,051 m² 2002 160,267,792,000 
2. 274,682 m² 2003 151,091,383,115 
 
Explanation: 
• KSPP in 2002 was a contract between Perum Perumnas represented by its President 
Director with Bangun Cipta Karya Perkasa Ltd represented by its Director. The equity 
value of IDR 160,267,792,000 of the land of 375,051 m² came from the average land 
price per m² of IDR 427,350. 
• KSPP in 2003 was a contract between Perum Perumnas represented by its President 
Director with Karya Megah Permai Ltd represented by its President Director. The 
equity value of IDR 151,091,383,115 of the tanah of 274,682  m² owned by Perum 
Perumnas came from the average land price per m² of IDR 550,000. 
Summing up the revenue from the contracts in 2002 and 2003, Perum Perumnas earned 
revenue from the equity share of IDR 311,359,175,115 from the total land submitted in 
the KSPP of 649.733 m². 
However, when we examine carefully, particularly in determining the selling price of land 
per m² on those years, actually Perum Perumnas suffered a very large loss considering 
two things: first, the land price owned by Perum Perumnas sold to Bangun Cipta Karya 
Perkasa Ltd in 2002 was below the Selling Value of Tax Object (NJOP) per m². In 2000 
alone, NJOP in the area of Bumi Cengkareng Indah (BCI) reached IDR 614,000/m². 
Similarly, in the KSPP between Perum Perumnas with Karya Megah Permai Ltd in 2003 
the land was only valued at IDR 550,000/m², whereas referring to the NJOP in that year 
the land price was already at IDR 916,000/m². 
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The very low selling price of land owned by Perum Perumnas was attributed to the fact 
that long before, in 2000, Perum Perumnas lowered the NJOP of land in Cengkareng 
from IDR 614,000/m² to IDR 335,000/m². The lowering of NJOP was approved by the tax 
office of West Jakarta. To lower the NJOP, Perum Perumnas issued a fund of IDR 60 
million to the finance survey team of the Tax Office of West Jakarta. Similarly in 2003, the 
NJOP of land owned by Perum Perumnas, which was later sold to Karya Megah Permai 
Ltd, was only IDR 3940/m², whereas in that year NJOB in the area of BCI was already at 
the level of IDR 916,000/m². 
Secondly, in 2000, Perum Perumnas aggreed a cooperation of land selling in 
Cengkareng with Ancol Pusaka Ltd. In that year, it was agreed between President 
Director of Ancol Pusaka Ltd and President Director of Perum Perumnas, that Ancol 
Pusaka Ltd would buy the land of 49,566m² with the value of IDR 741,000/m² net without 
filling in. But later, in September 2002, the agreement was cancelled unilaterally by 
Perum Perumnas. Perum Perumnas later made a transaction with another developer, 
Bangun Cipta Karya Perkasa Ltd, with a much lower price. This agreement was also 
cancelled as it had not engaged the President Director of Perumnas. 
Thirdly, the selling price of Perum Perumnas land to the two companies was much lower 
per m² than the price of land marker in Cengkareng. In 2000, the land price by m² in 
accordance with the market was IDR 1,000,000/m2, while in 2003 the market price of 
land in the area of Cengkareng skyrocketed to IDR 3,000,000/m².  
Based on the facts compared above, it can be calculated how much loss was suffered by 
Perum Perumnas, as indicated in Table 22. 
 
Table 22. Estimation of Loss of Perum Perumnas 
Selling Price BCKP 
Ltd & KMP Ltd 
IDR 479,211/m² 
Price offered by 
Ancol Pusaka Ltd 
IDR 741,000/m² 
Price based on NJOP 
of 2000 
IDR 614,000/m² 
Market price of 2000 
IDR 1,000,000/m² 
311,359,175,115 481,452,153,000 398,936,062,000 649,733,000,000 
State Loss 170,092,977,885   87,576,886,885 338,373,824,885 
Note: total area of land sold was 649,733 m² 
 
Table 22 compares prices of land in 2000. The total loss suffered by the state on the sale 
of the land would go up if the price comparison were conducted on the basis of the year 
of transaction. The sale of Perum Perumnas land happened in two different time periods. 
The selling to BCKP Ltd was started in 2002 and that to KMP Ltd was conducted in 2003. 
The case is, from year to year, the trend of land price is not decreasing, it is even 
increasing. Therefore, the selling of land to BCKP Ltd and KMP Ltd has no economic 
value and caused great loss to the state. The state became the party suffering from a 
great loss as all assets of Perum Perumnas are state wealth that had been separated 
from the State Budget.   
 
The lowering of NJOP in 2000 violated tax rules 
The regulation on land building tax (PBB) was Law Number 12 Year 1994 concerning the 
amendment of Law Number 12 Year 1985 regarding PBB. In the Law, there was no 
single article stipulating the issue of lowering of NJOP. Article 3 of Law Number 12/1994 
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only mentions about the matter of tax objects exempted from PBB which include land and 
buildings: 
• Used solely for public interest in the area of religious practice, social affairs, health, 
education and national culture which are not aimed to gain profit. 
• Used for cemetery, archeological heritage, or the like. 
• Protected forest, wildlife reserve, tourism forest, national park, herding land managed 
by village administration, state land not yet taxed. 
• Used for diplomatic mission, consulate based on reciprocal treatment principle. 
• Used for representative of international organizations as determined by Ministry of 
Finance. 
Apart from stipulating the matters of tax objects exempted from tax, the other aspects 
stipulated are reduction of indebted tax. But even these provisions do not mention any 
clause on the mechanism to lower NJOP. As for reduction of indebted tax, the Ministry of 
Finance can grant it upon examining the following conditions: 
• Farming land with limited revenue owned/managed or exploited by individual tax 
payer. 
• Tax object whose sale value increases due to the development project or 
environmental development, owned/managed or exploited by individual tax payer 
with low income. 
• Tax object owned/managed or exploited by individual tax payer with income solely 
from pension, so that the obligation of paying PBB is difficult to fulfil. 
• Tax object owned/managed or exploited by institutional tax payer who suffer from 
loss and has a serious problem of liquidity along the year making it unable to fulfil the 
routine obligations of the company. 
• Tax object owned/managed or exploited by other groups of low income community so 
that it is difficult for them to fulfil their obligation of paying PBB. 
Other conditions where reduction of indebted tax can be granted are natural disaster and 
other extraordinary causes and the reductions are determined to be 25 per cent, 50 per 
cent, 75 per cent or 100 per cent by the Head of PBB Payment Service based on 
appropriate and objective consideration in accordance with the level/percentage of tax 
object damaged by disaster or other extraordinary causes.56 
Other things stipulated in the Law are objection and appeal responding the issuance of 
SPPT. There are times when a tax payer has an objection with the reason that the 
payment is not in accordance with his/her obligation; the tax payer is granted a right to 
file an objection to the Director General of Tax in a period of three months from the arrival 
of letter of notification or letter of decision.57 
In the context of lowering NJOP as requested by the Board of Directors of Perumnas to 
the Tax Office of West Jakarta, there were no elements that could have been used as 
normative-procedural grounds related to a tax object exempted from tax, reduction of 
                                                   
56
 Achmad Tjahjono dan Muhammad F. Husain, ‘Perpajakan’, UPP AMP YKPN:1997, hal. 448-449 
57
 Ibid, p. 447 
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indebted tax or objection filing mechanism on tax levied. Given that, the request for lower 
NJOP which was later granted by the Tax Office of West Jakarta on the Perum 
Perumnas land in Bumi Cengkareng Indah, from the value of IDR 614,000/m² to IDR 
335,000/m², did not have a clear legal foundation. 
Even when we examine the case chronologically, it can be said that the attempt to lower 
NJOP on the BCI land had a connection with the plan of selling the land to a third party. 
As explained in several sections above, after the request for lower NJOP on the BCI land 
submitted by Perum Perumnas to the Tax Office of West Jakarta was approved in 2000 – 
a year later, on August 1, 2001 to be precise – the Board of Directors sold the land the 
NJOP of which has been lowered to Bangun Cipta Karya Perkasa Ltd with various price 
rates as bound by Act of Transaction number 01 between the Director of 
Administration/Finance of Perum Perumnas with the Director of Bangun Cipta Karya 
Perkasa Ltd. For Bloc A3 of BCI area of 46,713.50 m², the price agreed was IDR 
500,000/m2. For the land of Bloc D1 in BCI area of 96,373.50 m² the price of IDR 
350,000/m² was agreed and the land in Bloc D3 in BCI area of 115,679 m² was valued at 
IDR 360,000/m².  
Although the Act of Transaction was later annulled by the President Director of Perum 
Perumnas, as mentioned in the Act of Annulment Number 03 dated October 11, 2001, 
this did not mean that the Board of Directors did not intend to sell the land. A new 
agreement in the Act of Cooperation Agreement Number 04 dated October 16, 2001 was 
issued, and later Act of Cooperation Agreement Number 03 dated November 21, 2001 by 
the same President Director. The new President Director of Perum Perumnas replaced 
the Act of Cooperation Agreement Number 03 and 04 with a new one dated June 10, 
2002 through Letter of President Director of Perum Perumnas Number 327/62//VI/2002 
as First Party and Letter of Director Number 056/BCKP/DIR/VI/2002 as Second Party. 
Even in 2003, another Cooperation Agreement was enacted between the new President 
Director of Perum Perumnas and Karya Megah Permai Ltd.  
In brief, the attempt to lower NJOP over the land owned by Perum Perumnas in the area 
of Bumi Cengkareng Indah in 2000 had nothing to do with reasons or procedures that 
were acceptable as Law Number 12 of 1994 concerning PBB had stipulated them. 
However, the attempt was closely related to the sell-and-purchase activities taking place 
in later years that led to the loss suffered by Perum Perumnas of up to hundreds of billion 
rupiah and the loss affecting the middle to lower class community who cannot enjoy 
decent and affordable housing. This is the case considering that BCKP Ltd and KMP Ltd 
have developed luxurious real estate on the land bought from Perum Perumnas at a very 
cheap rate. 
 
The development of real estate by BCKP Ltd and KMP Ltd violated SIPPT licence  
On August 5, 2002, the Governor of DKI Jakarta, Sutiyoso issued the Letter of Licence of 
Land Appropriation (SIPPT) Number 1557/-1.711.5 addressed to the President Director 
of Perum Perumnas at that time, with regard to a tract of land of approximately 
367,732 m². The SIPPT itself was issued after the President Director sent letter Number 
006116 on March 28, 2002 concerning a request to use a land area of about 375,051 m² 
to develop housing and facilities.  
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The stipulations as mentioned in the SIPPT issued by Sutiyoso were appropriated to: 
a) Very small houses. 
b) Small houses. 
c) Flats. 
d) Office/Trade. 
e) Public Service. 
f) Education. 
g) Religious facility. 
h) Social and cultural facility. 
i) Improvement of Recreation Facility. 
j) Improvement of Green Park. 
k) Improvement of Channel. 
l) Roads.   
Precisely that land of 375,051 m2 was developed in partnership with Bangun Cipta Karya 
Perkasa Ltd as agreed in the Act of Cooperation Agreement between President Director 
of Perum Perumnas, and Director of BCKP Ltd.  
In the course of its implementation, however, the SIPPT was not fulfilled by Perum 
Perumnas as the licence holder. The development on the land turned out to be 
appropriated for luxurious real estate which was later known as Mutiara Taman Palem, 
instead of those types of house and different facilities as mandated in the SIPPT.  
The area of Mutiara Taman Palem itself was then sold at a very expensive unit price. For 
example, Table 23 contains a range of prices of house units in Mutiara Taman Palem. 
 
Table 23. Prices of houses in Mutiara Taman Palem 
Bloc No. of Storeys Land Price (IDR) 
A2 4½  4.5 x15 1,120,000,000 
A3 4½  4.5 x15 1,071,000,000 
A5 4½  4.5 x 15 1,071,000,000 
A15 3½  4.5 x15    578,000,000 
Source: Mutiara Taman Palem Brochure 
 
The case is similar with the cooperation between Perum Perumnas with Karya Megah 
Permai Ltd in 2003. On the land of 274,682 m² has been developed a luxurious real 
estate area called The City Resort.  
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Table 24. Price of Land Parcel in The City Resort 
Bloc Size of parcel Price per parcel (IDR) 
B08 165 214,500,000 
B09 125 168,750,000 
B08 225 303,750,000 
 
Corruption Allegation in Region III of Perumnas, Lebak – West Java 
The essence of this case is corruption in land purchase implicated the Taperum fund, the 
fund of Perumnas itself and perpetrated by the cronies of several Perumnas officials and 
the Office of the Minister of People’s Housing. The case caused a loss to Perumnas of 
IDR 36 billion, coming from the mark up of land purchase.  
The case of the Maja land purchase was estimated to have a strategic value and have a 
national scale, as Maja New City would be established on this land of 3,000 hectares. It 
was planned that a relatively complex infrastructure would be developed, involving many 
different ministries with the value of hundreds of billion rupiah.  
In this case, Perum Perumnas was implicated in the purchase and the development of 
environmental infrastructure. The Maja New City was planned by the Office of the 
Minister of People’s Housing (at the time of Minister Ir Akbar Tanjung) in cooperation with 
private developers and state-owned companies. In the course of the project, the 
developers started to purchase land. However, the developers later faced difficulties in 
developing infrastructure. 
It was decided that the best solution was to involve the government. The Government 
then instructed Perumnas to develop the infrastructure on the land of 600 ha, which 
eventually shrank into 360 ha. Perumnas was willing to develop the infrastructure as the 
Ministry would help the finance by using Taperum fund. 
According to Presidential Decree Number 14 Year 1993 dated February 15, 
1993Presidential Decree Number 46 Year 1994, the appropriation of Taperum fund can 
only be used for housing development, and not for land purchase/investment.  
In the first phase, IDR 8 billion was transferred directly to the account of Branch III, 
however the fund transfer should not have been made directly to Branch. When the 
Perumnas Headquarter protested, the fund was transferred through the Perumnas 
Headquarter first. 
The land purchase in the location of Maja was done through a third party (land broker). A 
number of Perumnas officials carried out the land purchase discreetly. This is not in line 
with the regulations provided in the Principle Licence. 
Until now the land purchase still takes place and has reached an area of approximately 
300 ha in an irregular shape, sporadic and scattered. The official market land price 
around the location is IDR 1,500 to IDR 2,000 per m2 but Perumnas bought from Ir 
Sibarani with the price of IDR 8,000 to IDR 12,000 per m2. 
When the monetary crisis struck in the process of land purchase, the plan of Maja New 
City became unclear. Consequently, there has been no development on the land bought 
by Perumnas until now. This is also associated with the selection of location that had not 
involved a clear feasibility study.  
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Without the development on the land of Perum Perumnas in Maja the capital invested 
was left idle for a considerably long time, while the capital borrowed from Taperum fund 
has to be returned.  
 
Allegation of violation 
From this case it can be concluded that there were violations as follows: 
• Land purchase using third party (land broker). This is against the letter of principle 
licence given by the National Bureau of Land Affairs (BPN).  
• Due to cooperation with a third party and the mark-up of price in the land purchase, it 
was alleged that the state suffered a loss of IDR 36 billion: 
Area of land      360 ha (3,600,000 m2) 
Official land price     = IDR  2,000/m2 
Price of land bought by Perum Perumnas  = IDR 12,000/m2 
State suffers loss of 3,600,000 x IDR10,000  = IDR 36 billion 
 
Corruption Allegation in Region III of Perumnas, Cisoka – Tangerang 
The essence of this case is corruption in pembebasan tanah  ( literally the ‘freeing of the 
land’ ) in Cisoka, Tangerang in 1996. From a material viewpoint, the case caused a loss 
to the state finance of IDR 1.5 billion. The case was investigated by SPI Perumnas, and 
put in the Report of SPI Number SPI/101/XI/96 dated November 19, 1996. 
The process of land purchase in Cisoka was initiated with the plan of Perum Perumnas to 
buy land in the site of about 100 ha. The process of purchase itself was carried out by 
third party (land broker) to deal with the residents who own land. For the purpose, 
Perumnas issued a down payment of IDR 1.5 billion to the land broker to purchase 8 ha. 
Despite the down payment made, until now Perumnas has not occupied the land 
promised.  
The land purchase procedure is supposed to be started by obtaining the Principle 
Licence from respective Local Government according to the Letter of Decision of Minstry 
of Home Affairs. However, until now the Local Government has not issued the Principle 
Licence. The site selection process did not meet the standards applied in Perum 
Perumnas, either, i.e. technical feasibility, market feasibility and price feasibility. 
Although Perumnas has disbursed the down payment for the land purchase of IDR 1.5 
billion, even until now the land does not exist (is fictitious). When the purchase had been 
taking place for three months with no progress, a Perumnas Official assigned a different 
broker to buy land on the same site. This attempt did not work, as some of the land 
certificates of the community in the site had been held by the first broker. There is a 
strong allegation that the inability of the first broker to deliver was due to the fact the 
down payment of IDR 1.5 billion had already been distributed to related officials, so that 
the broker had no more funds to continue the land purchase. 
With the land certificate taken but payment never made, the land owners who know 
about this issue filed the case to the State Attorney of Tangerang and Attorney General. 
However, Perumnas later appointed a legal consultant to defend its implicated official, 
who is a retired attorney. The result is that the case got not further than the attorney 
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office. The agreement between Perumnas and YPHI was signed with a contract number 
Dirut/25/10/I/99.  
 
Allegation of violation 
In this case there are several violations as follows: 
• Land purchase using the service of a broker. This is clearly against the letter of 
principle licence issued by BPN office of Tangerang with the Letter of Decision of the 
Head of Land Affairs Office of Tangerang District Number 460.04-SK.393. 
• Disbursement of down payment of IDR 1.5 billion for the land purchase that was 
never returned. 
 
Corruption Allegation in Region III of Perumnas, Klender – East Jakarta 
In essence, the case was about KSPP (Contract of Cooperation in Construction and 
Marketing) between Perumnas and Nindya Karya Ltd in the site of Malaka Asri Klender, 
East Jakarta. In this case the state through Perumnas suffered a loss of IDR 4.2 billion.  
The case began when Perumnas signed a cooperation contract with Nindya Karya Ltd, 
another state-owned company, to construct and market housing in Klender, East Jakarta. 
Under the cooperation as many as 267 units of homes were constructed and all were 
already marketed to the community. 
According to the cooperation, the income from the sale of houses and land would be 
deposited to a joint account. The bank will then transfer the money to the accounts of 
both parties, the amount of which would be in accordance with the percentage of their 
respective equity. 
There is an odd thing here as while all homes were sold Perum Perumnas has not 
received all of its right of IDR 4.2 billion. This is caused by the fact that Nindya Karya Ltd 
did not deposit that amount to the account of Perumnas.  
 
Allegation of violation 
• The fact that the money resulted from the sale of houses and land of IDR 4.2 billion 
was not deposited in the joint account is a violation of agreement leading to a state 
loss of more than IDR 4.2 billion. 
 
Corruption Case in Land Filling In in Region III of Perumnas, Cengkareng 
The essence of the case is corruption in land filling in of Perumnas in Cengkareng, West 
Jakarta. Because of the case, the site of housing has many times suffered from flood and 
protests were raised by the residents. Corruption in this land filling in has the value of 
more than IDR 20.6 billion.  
The site in Cengkareng was obtained by Perumnas from Jakarta Government and about 
215 ha of it was purchased by itself. The plan of housing development in Cengkareng 
was included in the programme of Perumnas. As the land condition was low, the site 
required filling in.  
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The game was played starting with the appointment of the filling in contractor in such a 
way that the bid was won by someone named Sei Yu. It turned out that the filling in was 
not carried out to the plan made by consultant Arkonin Ltd, as the average height was 
less than 60 cm.  
In 1996 the issue emerged as flood happened often and a re-test was conducted. The 
case was then settled. The flood was caused by the reduction of filling in land by the 
contractor, so that the rain water could not flow to the drainage system and create a 
runoff.  
To overcome the flood problem, measures were taken to cover up this matter, for 
example by changing the site of Cengkareng into Kasiba (Ready-to-Build Area), by 
appointing consultant to redesign the site plan using the concept of Kasiba. However, the 
Government of Jakarta has not approved this. 
 
Allegation of violation 
In this case, it was alleged that there is a violation causing state loss, i.e.: 
• Corruption in land filling in, conducted by reducing the height of filling in land with the 
average of 60 cm. As a result of this, the state suffered a loss of:  
215 ha x 0.60 x IDR.16,000 = IDR 20,640,000,000. 
 
Corruption Allegation in Region III of Perumnas, Jonggol – West Java  
 
Land Purchase of Official House of Satwalpres 
In brief, this is a corruption in the process of land purchase and the development of 
housing and its infrastructure. Because of this, the state through Perumnas suffered a 
loss of more than IDR 18.5 billion. The case was investigated by SPI Perumnas and put 
in a report of SPI Number SPI/101/XI/96 dated November 19, 1996. 
The case started with a cooperation in development of official housing between 
Perumnas and Satwalpres in the site of Jonggol. In the early agreement it was assumed 
that Satwalpres owned land on the site. Therefore a cooperation agreement was made 
between Perumnas and Satwalpres regarding the development of official Satwalpres 
housing on the land owned by Satwalpres.  
In reality, however, Satwalpres turned out not to own any land; therefore Perumnas was 
assigned to purchase land for the purpose. Perumnas then carried out the land purchase 
for the purpose of Satwalpres as well as for its own purpose. The land bought was as 
large as 85 ha out of the original plan of 175 ha. 
In making the purchase Perumnas used the service of a land broker. There was a mark-
up from the price according to NJOP of IDR 5,000 to 7,500 per m2 with Perumnas buying 
at the price of IDR 17,000 to 19,000 per m2 – there was even a piece bought by Perum 
Perumnas at the price of IDR 50,000 per m2.  
A part of the land purchased was also outside the site licence, with an area of 75 ha at 
the price of IDR 17,000/m2. The site constituted a technical irrigation field and 
consequently the right could not be obtained and no development could take place.  
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To accelerate the process of cashing funds for the purchase, a manipulation was made, 
where land was claimed to be owned by the broker and rights were handed over to 
Perum Perumnas. Because of this, the name of owner did not match the number of land 
lot in the letter C document in the village office, the land history book with the name and 
number of land lot in the detailed map and the Letter of Statement of Land Right 
Handling gave the owner as Perum Perumnas. This causes difficulty in obtaining land 
certification in BPN until even now. 
During the land purchase process, it turned out that several employees of Perumnas who 
were not authorized took part in the process. The land purchase process in Jonggol site 
took the life of a Perumnas employee named Tjetje Tadjudin. Tjetje died following torture 
during investigation in an attempt to uncover the case of the robbery of land-payment 
money, which had been held by the victim along with a land broker.  
With the existence of cooperation between Perumnas and broker, the State through 
Perumnas suffered a loss of IDR 8.075 billion.  
Later, during the development of housing and infrastructure, there was another mistake, 
which was the fact that house design was made without adjustment for local conditions or 
approval from the company’s Headquarters. The design was in many parts twisted and 
therefore many repair works were needed and cost Perum Perumnas around IDR 3 
billion. 
 
Allegation of violation 
In this case there were a number of violations leading to loss by the state, i.e.: 
• Land purchase using broker. This is against the letter of principle licence provided by 
BPN. 
• There was a mark-up of land price. 
• A part of the land bought was outside the site licence. 
• The manipulation of right hand-over indirectly by land owner to accelerate payment. 
This might cause a dispute in the attempt to obtain land right certification. 
• Design was used without a calculation to adjust with local condition and approval 
from the Perumnas Headquarter, which led to many damage. This forced Perumnas 
to make some repair which cost about IDR 3 billion. 
 
The state loss can be calculated as follows: 
• Price mark up harga from broker    IDR 8.075 billion 
• Housing renovation due to the low quality of building IDR 3 billion 
• Land purchased outside the location (irrigation) whose administration issues cannot 
be settled  
750,000 m2 x (IDR 17,000 – IDR 7,000)     IDR 7.5 billion 
leading to a total of more than 18.5 billion. 
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Corruption Case in Region IV of Perumnas, Sarijadi, Bandung 
 
The case of selling of KTM, Office House, and Mall Parcels of Sarijadi, Bandung 
The case is in essence a corruption through manipulation of determination of selling price 
of KTM, mall and office building parcels in Sarijadi, Bandung. In this case the loss is 
estimated to be more than IDR 23.7 billion.  
The case began with a transaction to sell commercial KTM, office house and mall parcels 
in December 1999 in Sarijadi site, Bandung, on Surya Sumantri Street to be precise. 
According to the job description, the selling of KTM was supposed to be carried out by 
working unit of Bandung Branch; however, in this case, that was conducted by the Office 
of Region IV c.q. Marketing Division. The sale comprised three phases as follows: 
1. The sale of a Mall parcel of 7000 m2 to Edy Sukanto with the letter of price approval 
from General Manajer of Region IV Number Reg.IV/1557/ KPTS/12/99 dated 
December 15, 1999 at the price of IDR 400,000 per m2 including 10 per cent VAT 
and 15 per cent discount (IDR 386,400,000 – leading to a net price of IDR 312,800 
per m2or a total of IDR 2,189,600,000). 
2. The sale of 100 office house parcels of 200 m2 each to the Provincial Legislature of 
West Java with the approval of the Board of Directors Number Dir.II/1119/19/XII/98 
dated December 30, 1998 and followed by an agreement of Region IV Number 
Cab.IV/03/01/99 dated January 14, 1999 at the price of IDR 340,000 per m2 including 
10 per cent VAT. In the implementation in 1999 it turned out that West Java 
Provincial Legislature could only afford to buy 46 pieces of land while the remaining 
54 units were sold on to Amalia Ltd at the price of IDR 340,000 per m2. 
3. The sale of KTM 66 units of 600m2 (13 parcels), 400 m22 (17 parcels) and 200 m2 
(36 parcels), and 72 parcels of 300 m2 (26 parcels), 200 m2 (46 parcels), at a price 
between IDR 400,000 and 500,000 per m2 with letter of price approval Number 
Reg.IV/502/10/99 dated October 5, 1999 to individuals and the price included 10 per 
cent VAT. 
The basis for the determination of selling price was NJOP around Surya Sumantri Street, 
Bandung, of IDR 802,000/m2in 1999. Meanwhile the basic land price as determined by 
the Bandung City Government in 1997 in the location around Surya Sumantri Street was: 
• Basic price  IDR   600,000/m2 
• Average price IDR   702,000/m2 
• Market price  IDR 1,250,000/m2 
The Project Plan Manual did not yet gain approval from the Headquarter / Planning 
Division of Region IV. Based on that, it was alleged that there was a collusion with the 
buyers during the selling of KTM as the price was below the value of NJOP/ market price. 
Based on the NJOP of IDR 802,000/m2, Perum Perumnas suffered a loss as follows: 
• From the selling of KTM/mall parcels of 7000 m2  
(IDR 802,000 – IDR 340,000) x 7,000 m2 = IDR 2,814,000,000. 
• From the selling of 100 of office-house parcels @ 200 m2  
(IDR 802,000 – IDR 340,000) x 20,000 m2 = IDR 9,240,000,000. 
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Significant loss has been disclosed by BPKP of West Java representative, but upon a 
negotiation the disclosure was not mentioned among the audit findings of BPKP – 
Headquarter for the Financial Report of 1999. 
Therefore, in the Sarijadi case of Bandung, Perumnas suffered loss: 
• In the selling of KTM in Bandung City Perumnas suffered a loss of  
IDR 2.814 billion + IDR 9.240 billion = IDR 12.054 billion 
• In the selling of 66 parcels and 72 KTM parcels of total area of 38,800m2 Perumnas 
suffered a loss of 
(IDR 702,000 – IDR 400,000) x 38,800m2 = IDR 11.717 billion 
This was the total loss of Perum Perumnas: IDR 23.717 billion. 
 
Corruption Allegation in Region IV of Perumnas, Teluk Jambe, Karawang 
Case of Land Purchase 
In essence the case was about mark-up practice in land purchase in the Teluk Jambe 
site, the Karawang Branch of Perum Perumnas. The work took place from 1994 to 1997, 
and so far a tract of land of 1,603,963 m2 has been purchased with the value of 
IDR 26,047,025,000. Apart from that there was a cost of honorarium for the committee of 
IDR IDR 1,024,504,145 without accountability from the recipients. 
During the purchase, Perumnas obtained the site licence from BPN Office of Karawang 
Number 460/Kep.21/P/BPN/94 dated February 26, 1994. The land purchase deviated 
from the site licence, as there were about 15 Ha of technical irrigation field purchase at 
the price of IDR 43,000/m2 to 53,000/m2 without price approval from the Board of 
Directors of Perum Perumnas, while the highest NJOP in the similar site was only IDR 
20,000/m2. Perum Perumnas in this case suffered a loss of:  
(IDR 53,000 – IDR 20,000) x 150,000 m2 = IDR 4,950,000,000. 
As a consequence of the purchase outside the site licence, the Right for Land 
Management (HPL) was not processed until the year 2000, as the land constituted a 
technical irrigation field. Because of that, Perumnas did not have enough funds to 
purchase land located within the site licence, leaving an enclave of about 304,720 m2 not 
yet purchased. This way the implementation of the overall project was delayed. 
In 1999 the NJOP in the site was IDR 7,500/m2, but Perumnas purchased the land at the 
price of IDR 12,000/m2 to 15,000/m2. The purchase allegedly implicated a number of 
officials in the Ministry of Housing and Settlement with Taperum fund. 
The incident continued until 1999 and followed was the purchase of the enclave land of ± 
88,295 m2 by engaging a third party at the price of IDR 40,000/m2 (while the NJOP was 
IDR 20,000/m2) leading to a total value of IDR 3,520,000,000 while payment was made in 
three tranches based on the Act of Transaction Binding Agreement on December 21, 
1999. 
Until June 2000 Perum Perumnas had paid as much as IDR 2,100,000,000, but had not 
got the ownership documents of those tracts of land. This way Perumnas suffered a loss 
of: 
(IDR 40,000 – IDR 20,000) x 88,295 m2 = IDR 1,765,900,000. 
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Allegation of violation 
In this case there were several violations: 
• Purchase using a broker, which was clearly against the letter of principle licence 
issued by BPN. 
• The fact that there was price mark-up.  
• The land purchased was partly outside the site licence. 
 
The state loss caused by these violations was: 
Honorarium for committee without accountability  IDR 1,024,504,145 
Technical irrigation land it was unable to exploit IDR 4,950,000,000 
Land it was unable to exploit    IDR 1,765,900,000 
Total state loss     IDR 7,740,404,145 
 
From various corruption allegations within Perumnas, the corrupt practices can be listed 
as illustrated in Table 25. 
 
Table 25. Summary of Perumnas corruption allegations 
No. Site Modus Operandi Loss 
(IDR billion) 
1. Region III of Perum 
Perumnas, Cengkareng 
Selling of land owned by 
Perumnas by lowering the selling 
value of tax object (NJOP) or 
mark-down of land selling 
(reduction of land price)  
311 
2. Region III of Perum 
Perumnas, Lebak 
Mark-up in land purchase  36 
3. Region III of Perum 
Perumnas, Cisoka 
Fictitious land purchase 1.5 
4. Perum Perumnas Region 
III, Klender 
Revenue from KSPP cooperation 
not submitted to state treasury 
4.2 
5. Region III of Perum 
Perumnas, Cengkareng 
Reducing the height of land filling  20.6 
6. Region III of Perum 
Perumnas, Jonggol 
Mark-up in land purchase 18.5 
7. Region IV of Perum 
Perumnas, Bandung 
Mark-down in land and parcel 
selling (reducing land parcel price) 
23.7 
8. Region IV of Perum 
Perumnas, Karawang 
Mark-up in land purchase 7.7 
Total State Loss IDR 423.2 billion 
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anti-corruption initiatives in this area of infrastructure services delivery.
This series of reports has been produced as part of a project entitled 
Accountability Arrangements to Combat Corruption, which was initially funded by 
the Department for International Development (DFID) of the British Government. 
The purpose of the work is to improve governance through the use of 
accountability arrangements to combat corruption in the delivery of infrastructure 
services. These findings, reviews, country case studies, case surveys and practical 
tools provide evidence of how anti-corruption initiatives in infrastructure delivery 
can contribute to the improvement of the lives of the urban poor.
The main objective of the research is the analysis of corruption in infrastructure 
delivery. This includes a review of accountability initiatives in infrastructure delivery 
and the nature of the impact of greater accountability. 
For more information, please visit WEDC’s web page: 
http://wedc.lboro.ac.uk/projects/new_projects3.php?id=191
Please note: The views expressed in this document are not necessarily those of 
the Department for International Development or WEDC, Loughborough University.
